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Abstract 
Due to the current urgent warfighter needs—documented in the Joint  Urgent 
Operational Needs Statement (JUONS)—and the need for increasing the speed of 
the Acquisition process, Program Managers (PM) find it increasingly necessary to 
utilize Contractor Logistic Support to field these rapid acquisition programs. The 
logistics support concepts used to maintain and service these systems play a large 
part in determining the overall lifecycle cost of a system. More efficient and effective 
logistics support plans can translate to substantial cost savings. Under the 
appropriate conditions, Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) is an effective means to 
support and expedite rapid acquisition programs and to get the equipment quickly 
into the hands of the warfighter. For example, the Self-Protected Adaptive Roller Kit 
System (SPARKS) is a 3,500-pound roller that is used to pre-detonate Improvised 
Explosive Device (IEDs) in roadways. The JUONS process identified this 
requirement, and the Department of the Army established and directed Product 
Manager Improvised Explosive Device Defeat/Protect Force (PM IEDD/PF) to 
manage the overall effort in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The purpose of this study is 
to identify potential cost savings to PM IEDD/PF and to the US Army by conducting 
an analysis of the CLS Contract for SPARKS, focusing on the current Maintenance 
Plan, Personnel requirements, Technical Data, and Supply Support. 
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I. Introduction/Literature Review 
A. Introduction 
1. Purpose/Scope  
Due to the current urgent warfighter needs—documented in the Joint  Urgent 
Operational Needs Statement (JUONS)—and the need for increasing the speed of 
the Acquisition process, Program Managers (PM) find it increasingly necessary to 
utilize Contractor Logistic Support to field these rapid-acquisition programs.  
Accordingly, the logistics support concepts used to maintain and service these 
systems play a large role in determining the overall Lifecycle Cost (LCC) of a 
system.  More efficient and effective logistics support plans can translate into 
substantial cost savings. 
Under appropriate conditions, Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) is an 
effective means to expedite rapid-acquisition programs and to get the equipment to 
the warfighter quickly.  For example, the 3,500-pound Self-Protected Adaptive Roller 
Kit System (SPARKS) is used to pre-detonate Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).  
The JUONS process identified this critical requirement, and the Department of the 
Army established and directed PM IED Defeat/ Protect Force (PM IEDD/PF) to 
manage the overall effort of this new program for Iraq and Afghanistan.  
The purpose of this study is to identify potential cost savings to PM IEDD/PF 
and the US Army by conducting an analysis of the current CLS Contract for 
SPARKS.  The study focuses on the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP) in the 
areas of the Maintenance Plan, Personnel Requirements, Technical Data, and 
Supply Support for the Iraq Area of Operations, specifically.  The study also seeks to 
determine if this program can be modified to incorporate future cost savings for the 
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B. Research Questions 
1 Primary Question 
 Can cost savings be realized for the SPARKS program?  
2. Secondary Question 
 Does PM IEDD/PF’s current logistics management plan represent the 
best allocation of resources?  
 What are the operational and technical characteristics of the system? 
 Can one transform from CLS to a hybrid mix of CLS and 
Organizational/Unit support? 
C. Methodology 
This research study is a mix of quantitative and qualitative methods and uses 
open literature, DoD policies, Army Regulations, and forecasting models in order to 
optimize and determine if there is a best mixture of cost savings and performance 
metrics for the SPARKS program. 
D. Limitations 
1. This thesis does not cover the implementation of Performance-based 
Logistics (PBL), but will consider the overarching concepts of PBL. 
2. We will only focus on the high-value and historically most-used parts of 
the SPARKS program to delineate organic versus contractor 
maintenance support. 
3. Although SPARKS is being used in Iraq and Afghanistan, this thesis 
only examines Iraq systems. 
4. The data used to create the Microsoft Excel workbook used for this 
project contains proprietary pricing information. To obtain copies of this 
workbook, readers may contact the authors or the PM IEDD/PF office. 
E. Literature Review 
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The Department of Defense (DoD) currently defines Integrated Logistics 
Support (ILS) as “a composite of all the support considerations necessary to assure 
the effective and economical support of a system for its life cycle.  It is an integral 
part of all other aspects of system acquisition and operation” (DoD, 2001, p. 276).  
Furthermore, the DoD defines logistics as: 
Planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It 
includes those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design 
and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, 
maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, 
evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or 
construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and 
d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (DoD, 2001, p. 326) 
b. Development of ILS  
The threads for developing the modern concept of integrated logistics support 
(ILS) have roots in the earliest days of warfare in the United States.  Primary and 
secondary requirements divide all classes of logistics requirements—primary 
requirements are those that directly support tactical units; secondary requirements 
are those that support the means used to fill the primary requirements (Huston, 
1966, p. 659).  During the Civil War, General Sherman recognized that an army 
could not operate more than 100 miles from its base, since the horses used to move 
the supplies by wagon consumed the entire contents of the wagon over this distance 
(p. 659).  This idea extrapolated to modern warfare brings forth the concept that 
logistics creep is a detriment and a limiting factor of any nation to wage war 
effectively.  Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles calls this creep the “logistic snowball,” and 
describes how logistic activities have a propensity to outgrow the forces they support 
(Eccles, 1959, p. 102).  As the logistics activities continue to grow, an over-
expenditure on logistics will directly result in depriving combat forces of manpower, 
training, or equipment necessary for effective operation.  Other elements, such as 
transportation of supplies and raw materials, may also limit the efficacy of those 
combat forces.  In essence, as long as combat forces are limited by some logistic 
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Initially, the Ordinance and Quartermaster Bureaus of nineteenth-century 
America were responsible for most of the logistical concerns of the small national 
defense segment (Lynn, 1993, p. 253).  These bureaus managed large public 
arsenals, depots, and armories that produced most of the weapons and clothing for 
the Nation’s armed forces (p. 253).  A select few civilian producers met the 
remaining logistic requirements, built to standards specified by the appropriate 
bureau.  Both bureaus were relatively small, and due to a dependence on personnel 
detailed from combat arms and civilian contractors, oversight of civilian producers 
suffered (p. 253).  This led, in large part, to the establishment of a formal military 
logistic corps in 1912 (p. 253).  The National Defense Act of 1920 further delineated 
the importance of the effective integration of military logistics.  The Harbord Board, 
responsible for implementing the National Defense Act of 1920, allocated the 
function of logistics into what later became the G-4 of the General Staff; the bureaus 
designed, tested and issued equipment, and the Assistant Secretary of War 
interfaced with the civilian sector in military procurement (p. 255).  The next step was 
the establishment in 1923 of the Army Industrial College (p. 256).  The college 
formalized business connections between top business leaders and Army officers 
with a focus on production and procurement tasks encountered in the event of war 
(p. 256).  The Army Industrial College was the first of its kind and offered 
“opportunity for full time study and investigation of the basic industrial, economic, 
political, administrative, and other aspects of harnessing national resources in 
modern war” (p. 256).  Although the associated terminologies and concepts of ILS 
were not specifically identified until later, the link between effective logistics 
implementation and success on the battlefield was clearly understood by the 
Nation’s defense leadership by 1923. 
The defense sector introduced the specific concepts and doctrine of ILS in the 
1960s and refined them throughout the next four decades to their current state.  
Specifically, DoD Directive 4100.35, Development of Integrated Logistics Support for 
Systems and Equipment, issued on June 19, 1964, assured “effective logistics 
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managed as an integrated whole […] to obtain maximum material readiness and 
optimum cost effectiveness” (Criscimagna, 1977, p. 59).  The directive was jointly 
developed by the DoD Equipment Maintenance and Readiness Council and the 
Maintenance Advisory Committee of the National Security Industrial Association (p. 
59).  This directive was a milestone in and of itself, because it represented the first 
official move toward improving the development of a logistic support system, and it 
was unique in that it demonstrated a universal understanding that effective and 
economical support systems were essential for the long-term success of both 
industry and the DoD (p. 59).  
One of the first key meetings for organizing and implementing ILS took place 
in October 1965: the first Electronics Industries Association Conference on Systems 
Effectiveness (p. 59). The DoD Directive 4100.35 was one of the main discussion 
points, and C.W. Winkler of Douglas Aircraft presented a paper that outlined the 
seven basic elements of ILS at that time, making these key observations: 
1. ILS is necessary for the development of an effective and economical 
support system. 
2. For the most part, the cost of ownership of weapon systems far 
exceeds the development and investment costs. 
3. The cost of ownership of weapon systems is most effectively controlled 
by emphasis on ILS as early in the conceptual phase of the system as 
possible. 
4. ILS represents the start-to-finish life cycle planning of total 
maintenance and logistics support of weapon systems (p. 60). 
ILS was continually refined over the next several years as industry and DoD 
officials alike worked to fully understand and implement this DoD Directive.  George 
J. Vechietti of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) gave a 
presentation at the First Annual Logistics Management Symposium. This symposium 
covered the award-fee contract strategy and early identification and analysis of 
logistics support requirements that NASA was utilizing to improve its logistics 
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Dynamics addressed the second Systems Effectiveness Conference on the specific 
elements of system effectiveness and cost effectiveness and their relationship to 
integrated logistics support (p. 60).  Likewise, at the Sixth Annual Reliability and 
Maintainability Conference, John E. Losee discussed how Air Force programs were 
developing quantitative logistics performance parameters early in programs’ life 
cycles (p. 60). Further guidance from the DoD came in the form of the ILS Planning 
Guide for DoD Systems and Equipment, issued in October of 1968 as a tool to help 
industry and the DoD identify and establish “a systematic management approach to 
the early integration of support criteria into design activities” (DoD, 1968, p. 3).  The 
first major implementation of ILS in a DoD weapon program occurred in the B-1 
bomber and the F-15 fighter programs, with the ILS directorate having an equal 
footing with other directorates such as engineering (Criscimagna, 1977, p. 60).  This 
move was a milestone in defense system programming because it gave recognition 
to the importance of ILS and set the stage for ILS integration into all programs. 
During the 1980s, the Defense Acquisition Improvement Program 
emphasized improved readiness throughout the Department of Defense (DoD).  
Some of the core areas of emphasis included: establishment of operational 
readiness objectives by system development programs, the mandate of greater 
visibility of both logistics and support requirements in each Service’s Program 
Objective Memorandum (POM), the incorporation of reliability and maintainability 
specifications into program design, and incentives for contractors to design for 
reliability and support (DoD, 1986, May).  Initially, ILS policy focused on the 
development and integration of a total logistical support configuration.  While this is 
still an important aspect of ILS, the current focus of the DoD is on logistics and 
maintenance costs in the system design phase.  Program Managers are responsible 
for ensuring that readiness and supportability objectives translate into specific 
design parameters that minimize LCC of the system while maximizing system 
readiness (Krieg, 2007).  This focus on reducing LCC resulted from the realization 
that a large portion of a system’s total LCC resulted directly from the operations and 
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decisions made early in the system design phase, specifically those involving design 
and management, proved to be vital in influencing costs associated with system 
operation and maintenance downstream.     
 
 
Figure 1. Typical Lifecycle Cost Distribution  
(Alford, 2000, p. 13) 
c. Current ILS Policy 
Army Regulation (AR) 700-127 states the purpose of the ILS process “is to: 1. 
Introduce and sustain fully supportable material systems in current and projected 
environments that meet operational and system readiness objectives at minimum 
Life Cycle Cost (LCC); 2. Right-size the logistics footprint (demand for logistics); 3. 
Reduce LCC and cycle times; [and] 4. Reduce duplication of efforts” (DoA, 2009, p. 
10).  Simply put, ILS is the iterative process of considering logistics and 
maintenance costs throughout the lifecycle of a system.  Typically, the most effective 
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development process.  ILS ensures system quality in terms of reliability, availability, 
maintainability, and testability through consideration of a strategy that: 
 Optimizes functional support elements of a system. 
 Leverages existing investments in manpower, systems, equipment, 
training, facilities, and other resources. 
 Guides the system engineering process using supportability to achieve 
goals, and to: 
¾ Identify the support (design the support and support the design), 
¾ Influence the best design alternative,  
¾ Refine the supportability strategy, 
¾ Influence the test and evaluation of both the system and 
supportability strategy, 
¾ Resource and acquire the requisite support, 
¾ Provide the support to the soldier, and 
¾ Improve the support and introduce and support material 
systems. 
¾ Ensures interoperability of material within the Army, Department 
of Defense (DoD) and coalition partners. (DoA, 2009, p. 10) 
The objective of the ILS process is to ensure that systems acquired by the 
DoD have a longer lifespan and a reduced logistical support requirement—thereby 
increasing the return on investment for a system with a long lifespan, as is the case 
in many DoD systems.  As such, AR 700-127 directs that all acquisition programs, 
including highly classified programs, will incorporate ILS as a method to help 
develop and direct the acquisition strategy through a detailed plan of the 
supportability strategy (DoA, 2009, p. 10).  It further defines that the supportability 
strategy will contain specific exit criteria for each phase of program development, 
and that the program’s probability of success model will specifically outline 
supportability decision points linked to milestones (p. 10).  The ILS methodology 
provides Program Managers with a framework that enables the project office to 
emphasize supportability early in the system lifecycle by influencing system 
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sustainability and maintainability considerations.  ILS helps optimize product support 
by ensuring a feasible supportability strategy is developed for the lifecycle of the 
system.  Finally, by encouraging the implementation of performance-based logistics 
(PBL), ILS helps Program Managers obtain data necessary to improve support 
systems continuously and to increase reliability throughout the operational lifecycle 
of the system (DoA, 2009, p. 11).   
In order to execute this strategy effectively, ILS relies on integration into the 
systems engineering process of product development (Blanchard, 1991, p. 23).  
While there is no commonly accepted definition of systems engineering in literature, 
DoD Regulation 5000.2-R defines the systems engineering process as one that will: 
1. Transform approved operational needs and requirements into an 
integrated system design solution through concurrent consideration of 
all life cycle needs (i.e., development, manufacturing, [Test and 
Evaluation] T&E, deployment, operations, support, training, and 
disposal). 
2.  Ensure the interoperability and integration of all operational, functional, 
and physical interfaces. Ensure that system definition and design 
reflect the requirements for all system elements: hardware, software, 
facilities, people, and data, characterize and manage technical risks. 
3. Apply scientific and engineering principles, using the system security 
engineering process, to identify security vulnerabilities and minimize or 
contain information assurance and force protection risks associated 
with these vulnerabilities. (DoD, 2002, p. 76) 
Further, DoD Regulation 5000.2-R states that Program Managers shall 
implement a sound systems engineering approach to translate approved operational 
needs and requirements into operationally suitable blocks of systems. The approach  
shall consist of a top-down, iterative process of requirements analysis, functional 
analysis and allocation, design synthesis and verification, and system analysis and 
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To do this effectively, programs must take into account the ten elements of 
ILS as defined by AR 700-127.  These elements, objectives, and brief descriptions 
are shown in Table 2, Appendix A, “Elements of Integrated Logistics Support.” 
By integrating these ten elements of ILS into the systems engineering 
process, Program Managers will enable the system to achieve not only the 
readiness levels required by the warfighter, but also a supportable design that 
ensures optimum logistics lifecycle costs.  Although it is ideal to have a system that 
optimizes all ten elements, tradeoffs between elements are likely to occur in any 
given program.  A logistical support analysis is the main tool employed by PMs to 
identify logistics support criteria and goals and to quantify system support plans in 
relation to the lifecycle of the system (DoA, 1989, p. 2).  Figure 2 from AR 700-127 
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Figure 2. Systems Engineering Integrated ILS Elements  
(DoA, 2009, p. 15) 
d. ILS and Non-developmental Items (NDI)/Commercial Off-
the-shelf (COTS) 
The NDI/COTS program is the Army’s preferred acquisition strategy over 
developmental programs (DoA, 1989, p. 5).  NDI/COTS items fall into two 
categories: Category A—those that require no modification and are used in the 
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operate in the intended environment (DoA, 1989, p. 5).  Obviously, the Program 
Manager’s ability to influence ILS planning in either case is limited; however, ILS 
should still be a factor in the supportability strategy that compliments the overall 
acquisition strategy.  Some factors that come into consideration are: 
 Reduced lead-time in acquisition means less time to prepare for 
organic support; 
 Standardization goals may not be reached; 
 An analysis of existing support elements should be conducted to 
determine suitability and adaptability; 
 Interim contract support should be considered during the requirements 
formulation. (DoA, 1989, p. 5) 
Additionally, the Defense Acquisition Guidebook directs:   
The acquisition strategy should state whether organic, contractor, or a 
mix of organic/contractor logistics support is the most cost-effective 
and operationally effective approach to support the item. Appropriate 
tradeoff analyses should be conducted to arrive at the most cost-
effective and operationally effective support strategy. Interim contractor 
support, incremental (block) development and fielding strategies, 
lifetime contractor logistics support, or full organic logistics support 
shall be considered and planned during the development of the 
acquisition strategy and definitized in the solicitation. (DoD, 1997, pp. 
21-26)   
Although the Program Manager most likely cannot influence the design of an 
NDI/COTS item, the elements of ILS and supportability issues should influence 
source selection. 
e. The Future: Revolution in Military Affairs and ILS  
Many theorists propose that the world is in the midst of a Revolution in 
Military Affairs (RMA) (Kane, 2001, p. 149).  To fully understand the implications on 
logistics of this RMA, it is necessary to describe the vision of a network-centric 
approach to warfare.  Network-centric warfare is not a single breakthrough 
technology, but rather a blend of ongoing trends in technology development that 
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involves the technology advances and the proliferation of sensors on modern 
battlefields that have greatly increased the ability to monitor statuses and friendly, as 
well as enemy forces.  The continued advances in communications and 
communication technology comprise the second trend and allow for real-time 
information flow, decentralized operations, and information sharing that is 
unprecedented.  The final trend of the RMA involves the increasing use of precision-
guided munitions for all modes of operations in combat.  Theoretically, all three 
trends provide the wherewithal to form a network that is multi-faceted and capable of 
detecting, communicating, and eliminating threats while also being difficult to 
defeat—since there is no decisive point to attack.  
While this RMA may indeed change the nature of war, the necessity of 
logistics will remain, and possibly grow.  Real sensors will 
communicate with real hardware nodes, and real munitions will destroy 
threats.  The logistics necessary to develop, operate, and sustain 
these systems could shrink over time as technology matures, but for 
the near future, these logistics will remain a formidable requirement.  
While the requirement for large armies to conduct massive campaigns 
may wane as the RMA progresses, it will be rare to neutralize an 
enemy without soldiers on the ground.  The necessary logistics support 
requirements for those soldiers, tanks, planes, and ships will remain for 
the near future.  As such, the need for effective management of 
logistics support requirements will likely increase as commanders 
struggle to balance an increasingly complex force.  ILS is the 
overarching doctrine and concept embraced by the United States 
Department of Defense (DoD) that enables effective management of 
logistics requirements. (Kane, 2001, p. 151) 
2. Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) 
a. Historical Perspective 
Contractor Logistical Support (CLS) is not a new and emerging trend; it has 
been evolving for several hundreds of years.  As early as the mid-1600s, armies 
utilized civilians for support of their armies while on the march, primarily for  
subsistence (Lynn, 1993, p. 17).  Prior to the mid-1600s, most advancing armies 
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threat of force, civil authorities agreed to provide money and goods to the general of 
the threatening army or to officials of the ruler he served” (1993, p. 17). 
Depending on the number of soldiers supplied, the occupying army could 
drain a town of its resources within a few days if that army did not have the logistical 
support accompanying it or if that support was too far behind. As a result, a new 
system emerged called the e`tapes system (Lynn, 1993, p. 17). Lynn explains, 
“’e`tapes’ originated in the word for market,” and through this system, the “troops on 
the march drew [purchased] their food from local markets or depots at set intervals 
along their route” (p. 17).  Although this type of support seemed transparent to the 
soldiers, it did require a significant amount of coordination to be executed 
expeditiously.  Advance parties would contact the local officials of the town and 
inform them of the day the troops would arrive and of the amount of food that would 
be required.  Then, the arriving soldiers would buy the supplies they needed from 
the local vendors.  
Huston (1966) describes another example of civilians providing support to 
armies during the War of 1812: “Many ordinary military supplies were obtained by 
the contract system, [in which] a contractor would undertake to furnish all necessary 
articles of supply for troops at a given post” (p. 99).  Huston also brings to light 
several issues that could occur as a result of these types of agreements:  
As Hamilton and Washington pointed out, the system of direct 
purchases by officers of the government put emphasis on satisfying 
the troops, on the quality of the supplies, and on assuring their 
delivery, but direct purchase was subject to the weakness of 
incompetent or unfaithful officials, and, since the buyers were little 
concerned with price, the system was likely to be less economical.  
 
Private contractors, on the other hand, were more interested in 
assuring their own profits than in delivering articles of good quality or 
making delivery at the times convenient to the purchaser. They were 
most concerned with prices; sometimes so much concerned that they 
postponed purchases and deliveries with a view of increased profits. 
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There appears to be a correlation of past practices and current procedures for 
the contracting of supplies.  For direct purchase of supplies, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) instituted the purchase card.  The card has several different limits, 
the most common being $2,500 for a single purchase.  The practice of using civilians 
to perform logistics functions within the DoD continues today.  A recent example of 
this practice is the use of contractors to support the US Army’s Stryker vehicle.  
When the program was established, the Product Manager (PM) used CLS to support 
the platform until an in-house military support organization was established. Once all 
the necessary personnel and support functions were in place, the PM transitioned 
the program from strictly CLS to a mix of CLS and organic support (Coryell, 2007, p. 
7).  The Department of the Army has instituted several guiding-principle documents 
concerning CLS: Department of the Army (DoA) Pamphlet 700-56 and Army 
Regulation (AR) 700-127. 
AR 700-127 is the guiding document concerning CLS—especially Chapter 6, 
which defines key terms, identifies areas of support, states policy for the application 
of CLS, and provides standard planning factors and contractor constraints.  
The AR defines two key terms, organic and CLS, in this chapter: 
Organic. Any logistics support performed by a military department 
under military control, using Government owned or controlled facilities, 
tools, test equipment, spares, repair parts, and military or civilian 
personnel, is considered organic support.  Logistics support provided 
by one military service to another is considered organic within DOD. 
Contractor logistics support. Logistics support of Army materiel 
performed under contract by commercial organizations (including the 
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Chapter 6 of AR 700-127 also delineates the areas of support for CLS 
consideration and may include materials, facilities, and services in the areas listed 
below. 
 Supply and distribution 
 Maintenance 
 Training 
 Software support 
 Rebuild/overhaul 
 Modification 
 System support (DoA, 2009, p. 46) 
AR 700-127 sets forth the policy guidelines in five major areas for using CLS.  
Initially, the Government must acquire or have access to the technical data 
concerning the program in question in order to permit competitive procurement.  
Secondly, the material developer (along with the material command) is responsible 
for the overall management of the contractor support.  This support should include 
contract administration, contract negotiations, contract award, contract budget, and 
budget programming (with regard to the overall program of support considered).  
The third policy principle is that system development will limit/minimize contract 
support personnel during combat operations.  The actions of the contract support 
personnel must be clearly justified in accordance with AR 715-9 Chapter 3: 
“Contractors Accompanying the Force,” if used during combat operations.  Next, the 
contractor support must be integrated into the DoD logistics chain and standard 
systems.  Finally, during wartime or contingency operations, the support contract 
must include a clause stating the requirement(s) of contractor support.  This will 
allow seamless and continuous support from garrison operations and deployment 
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The application of CLS is performed in two major areas: Interim Contract 
Support (ICS) and Lifecycle Contract Support (LCCS).  AR 700-127 defines ICS as, 
“The use of commercial support resources in lieu of organic capability for a 
predetermined amount of time. […] This includes the use of contractor support for 
initial fieldings” (DoA, 2009, p. 46). 
This was the case for the Stryker program mentioned earlier and is the case 
for the subject of this thesis: the SPARKS, explained in later chapters.  LCCS is 
defined as: 
A method of providing all or part of a system’s logistics support by 
contract, with the intention of continuing this support throughout its life 
cycle [cradle to grave]. (DoA, 2009, p. 46) 
LCCS considerations will be based upon readiness and availability 
requirements, LCC, support risks, design maturity, planned useful life, 
materiel system complexity, available manpower and personnel, and 
other acquisition and support issues. Wartime mission and deployment 
requirements will be the primary considerations on which support risks 
are based. (DoA, 2009, p. 47) 
The major difference between these two concepts is that LCCS is an 
acquisition technique, and ICS is a support concept.  Also, ICS should be used only 
in the short run (approximately three years), when the military support cannot be 
provided by the First Unit Equipped Date (FUED), as specified in the support 
strategy.  
Decision-makers should address several planning factors when considering 
the use of CLS for support actions.  First, CLS must be a cost-effective solution in 
order to provide logistics support in the intended geographic location.  Also, material 
developers must limit the burden on organic maintenance organizations and/or field 
maintenance organizations by limiting the use of contractors for maintenance 
functions soldiers can perform.  The decision to use CLS should be based on a 
tradeoff analysis of alternative support considerations during the early stages of the 
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strategy from the alternatives, accomplishment of support in both peacetime and 
wartime scenarios, effectiveness of support cost, and a determination of the 
government’s best interest when allowing for CLS.  Chapter 6 of AR 700-127 also 
states that the material developers and/or PM’s decision to use CLS should use the 
following factors to support the analyses:  
 Wartime operational readiness supportability 
 Compliance with 10 USC 2464 and related statutory laws 
 Need to maintain a peacetime training and rotational base for military 
technical personnel (manpower requirement data) 
 Security implications 
 Cost effectiveness 
 Availability of Test Program Sets (TPS) and Test, Measurement, and 
Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE) 
 Access to the technical data suitable for competitive procurement 
under contractor and/or organic support 
 Availability of repair parts and costs required to maintain stock levels to 
meet readiness requirements 
 Timeframe for fielding the system 
 Warranties under the acquisition contract 
 Spare parts pricing 
 Commercial activities program 
 Density of equipment and geographical dispersion 
 Training costs 
 Personnel skills required/available 
 Force structure 
 Contractors accompanying the force  
 Administrative and support workload 
 Design stability 
 Risk of commercial or military obsolescence 
 Availability of contractors to support the system over its expected life at 
all proposed locations (including mobilization conditions) 
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 Availability of technology and technological complexity of the system 
(DoA, 2009, pp. 46-47) 
CLS funding considerations should be in accordance with existing guidelines, 
utilizing the same accounts as if the work were performed by organic Army elements 
normally involved with such fielding activities.  “Normally, ICS is paid for with 
procurement funds, and LCCS is paid for with Operations and Maintenance (O&M), 
Army funds” (DoA, 2009, p. 46).  The PM is responsible for the programming, 
budgeting, and funding of the CLS contract while the supported items remain under 
his/her control. If the CLS contract supports several items under the PM’s control by 
the same contractor, then the PM should combine the efforts into a single contract if 
feasible (DoA, 2009, pp. 46-48). 
Finally, AR 700-127 establishes the constraints for contractors.  These 
constraints provide not only the Commander but also the PM a quasi checklist of 
items that should be considered when dealing with contractors.  Speaking on the 
use of contractors, the Department of the Army instructs: 
 Be operationally executable and [do] not infringe on the commander’s 
ability to execute missions. 
 Comply with Army policy on contractors accompanying the force set 
forth in AR 715-9. 
 Maintain Total Asset Visibility (TAV) of total system—to include 
supporting equipment and spares—while providing TAV to the Army 
In-Transit Visibility (ITV) network. Ensure that contractors feed ITV 
servers with data in the required format. 
 Comply with DOD policy to use the Defense Transportation System 
and DOD transportation hubs where practical and where it meets the 
warfighter’s performance requirements. If other than a DOD standard 
distribution system is recommended, DCS, G–4 through the DASA 
(ILS) will be notified of any intent to use a different distribution system 
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 Use standard Army Logistics Information Systems (LIS), formerly 
known as Army Standard Army Management Information Systems 
(STAMIS). These include: Standard Army Maintenance System–
Enhanced (SAMS–E), Unit Level Logistics System-Aviation Enterprise 
(ULLS-AE), Unit Level Logistics System–Ground (ULLS–G), Standard 
Army Retail Supply System-Objective (SARRS-O), Property Book Unit 
Supply Enhanced (PBUSE), and Transportation Coordinator’s 
Automated Information for Movements System (TC AIMS). 
 Transition seamlessly to the Global Combat Support System–Army 
(GCSS–A) when accepted, and interface completely with the Single 
Army Logistics Enterprise (SALE) as it develops at the business 
process/operational architectural level. 
 Be compatible with emerging doctrine for sustainment operations, such 
as two-level maintenance. (DoA, 2009, pp. 48-49) 
Also, Field Manual (FM) 100-10-2 (DoA, 1999) further defines items of 
consideration for the military commander when he/she is deciding whether or not to 
place a contractor within his/her formation for weapon system support. However, 
that discussion is outside the scope of this thesis and not included in this discussion.  
Chapter 16 of DoA PAM 700-56 (DoA, 2006) concerns contractor support.  
This chapter is subdivided into four distinct parts: selecting a support alternative, 
contractor support decisions, planning and documenting contractor support, and 
contract content.  
The sub-chapter about selecting a support alternative provides the basic 
outline for determining if CLS, whether ICS or LCCS, should be employed for 
support of the newly fielded system.  During the initial stages of the support-planning 
process, a tradeoff analysis should be completed to show that the selected 
alternative meets the following four criteria: 
 The support selected is the best/optimum solution from among the 
alternatives. 
 The support selected will provide the desired support outcomes during 
both wartime and peacetime operations.  
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 The selected alternative is in the best interest of the Government. 
(DoA, 2006, p. 42). 
b. Selecting a Support Alternative  
DoA PAM 700-56 further explains the first overarching criterion in the 
Contractor support decisions: contract content, which we will explain later in this 
review.  The second criterion determines that if the desired support cannot be 
obtained in wartime and peacetime operations, then a detailed tradeoff analysis 
should be completed.  In an effort to determine a solution for the best-value option, 
certain characteristics need consideration.  
The best value alternative to the Government depends upon system 
complexity, system density, expected system life, availability of trained 
personnel, availability of spare parts, tools, and test equipment, and 
the availability of a commercial support system in the areas of the 
world where the system will be deployed. (DoA, 2006, p. 42) 
Finally, with regard to the Government’s best interest, many NDI/COTS items 
are fielded as soon as possible before any type of organic support can be 
developed. If such is the case, CLS would be the best option for support while the 
organic capability was being developed and phased into the support structure (DoA, 
2006, p. 42).  
c. Contractor Support Decisions 
The tradeoff analysis should cover three major areas: the operational, 
economic, and technical aspects of the system. One of the operational tradeoffs 
areas includes the readiness requirements, commonly known as Operational 
Readiness Rates (OR rate) and expressed as: 
  .  
Other operational areas are the sustainability of the system, the system’s 
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also to maintain the system, and the wartime mission of the system (DoA, 2006, p. 
42). In addition, contractor personnel on the battlefield should be considered part of 
the operational tradeoff analysis. The management, legal considerations, and 
protection of these civilians are other major concerns for the operational 
commander, and the PM needs to address these potential concerns (p. 43). 
In order to determine whether organic support or LCCS will be used for 
system support, the economic analysis must involve the LCC. These costs have 
differing degrees of associated costs and occur in different places in the lifecycle of 
the system (p. 43).  “All of these costs must be assessed and played against one 
another as decisions on support are being made” (p. 43).  
When considering the technical aspects of the tradeoff analysis, the PM 
should weigh technology maturity and complexity of the individual components 
against the potential types of support. For instance, if “a very new technology is 
being used and the exact component design is likely to change after the initial 
fielding, then ICS for provisioning and depot maintenance might be the best choice 
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d. Planning and Documenting Contractor Support 
No matter what type of contractor support the PM decides on, it should be 
identified in detail in the Acquisition Strategy (AS) and should cover all the 
appropriate Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) elements developed by the PM, which 
are explained in detail in later sections of this chapter. In addition to the AS, 
contractor support should be included in the Material Fielding Plan—as outlined in 
AR 700-142, Chapter 5 (DoA, 2008)—to include any contractor support for the initial 
fielding of the system and ICS. In order to ensure continuous support for the system, 
the PM must plan the transition from ICS to organic support.  The content of the plan 
is not specified in AR 700-142 (2009) but should be mutually agreed upon by the 
major parties involved.  Chapter 16 identifies some of the content to be considered, 
including: 
 Logistics functions included in the ICS 
 The length of time ICS will be required 
 Procedures for possible extension of the ICS 
 Funding requirements 
 Control structure for ICS 
 A checklist of actions to be completed before transition can take place 
 Milestone dates for major actions up to transition date 
 Tracking and reporting procedures for transition 
 Contract data on maintenance actions, repair parts consumption, and 
other data beneficial to establishing organic support. (DoA, 2009, p. 
43) 
e. Contract Content 
Several important items need addressing in the prime contract when the PM 
determines CLS is the best option for support.  The first item that needs addressing 
is the Technical Data Package, which includes the maintenance data requirements 
during the deployment and sustainment phase of the acquisition lifecycle, any 
spares data requirements, and, finally, the configuration management (CM) of the 
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description of the product, which includes all the technical material describing the 
design of the system and the control of the manufacturing and quality of the system.  
Third, the support contract should include any technical manuals and the name of 
the personnel responsible for developing these manuals.  Next, the contract should 
address any requirements for tools, test and support equipment, manpower and 
personnel data, quantity of spare parts provided, software data documentation, 
reliability and maintainability requirements, and rates that must be achieved.  Finally, 
the contract must be specific in the division of the government and contractor 
responsibilities and must specify any issues of contractors on the battlefield 
supporting the system.  AR 700-142 Chapter 16 specifically defines the 
requirements for this division: 
 Maintenance—who does what, and does the contract specify 
maintenance tasks to be performed, or does it specify allowable 
downtime? 
 Supply—which supply functions is the contractor actually providing?  
The contract may include direct vendor delivery. 
 Materiel management—the contractor may be controlling all the 
ordering and distribution functions under the contract or may be 
working through the existing government system. The contract must be 
specific. 
 Overhaul/rebuild—the contractor’s function may be to perform the 
specified rebuild until a government depot maintenance facility is 
ready.  Another option is LCCS for depot maintenance at a contractor 
or Government-owned facility. 
 Other services—these may be contracted either individually or as part 
of a larger support contract. They include engineering support, 
configuration management, facilities, software support, or data 
processing functions. In each of these, the contract should specify 
what functions will be performed, what services will be provided, and 
what is specifically required of the Government in support of the 
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3. Performance-based Logistics (PBL) 
a. Introduction 
Performance-based Logistics (PBL) is the Department of Defense’s (DoD) 
preferred approach for product support (DoD, 2005).  The purpose of highlighting 
PBL in this thesis is to introduce a strategy that is viable, saves the government 
money and examines contractor/organic support.  A substantial amount of literature 
exists on the history, success and implementation of PBL. The goal of the PM is to 
minimize the overall logistics footprint required to sustain SPARKS and to identify 
and implement the right mix of contractor and organic support.  General George S. 
Patton said, “Never tell people how to do things.  Tell them what to do, and they will 
surprise you with their ingenuity” (Patton, 1947, p. 286). This is such the case with 
SPARKS. This program was established by the Department of the Army in response 
to a JUONS, and then it was handed off to the PM for execution with limited 
guidance. 
PBL, when used properly, can assist in setting up the desired structure to 
support SPARKS. Our Army currently relies upon a significant number of contractor 
personnel on the battlefield—a reliance that generates operational costs and legal 
issues.  Units that depend on contractor personnel for system support and 
maintenance must allocate precious resources to ensure their security and 
subsistence (Bolton, 2002, p. 1). 
The intent is to design, develop, and field systems that limit deployment of 
contractors and improve system reliability and ease of maintenance (p. 3).  PBL is 
specifically designed to meet the needs of the Army.  PBL needs to meet the 
warfighter’s operational requirements and be cost effective, as validated by a 
Business Case Analysis (BCA).  The PBL Support Guidebook explains, “PBL can 
help PMs optimize performance and cost objectives through the strategic 
implementation of varying degrees of Government-industry partnerships” (DoD, 
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PBL is not a one-size-fits-all strategy.  Figure 3 shows that strategies will vary 
along a spectrum, depending on the program, the age of the system (phase in the 
lifecycle), existing support infrastructure, organic/commercial capabilities, and 
legislative and regulatory constraints. 
 
Figure 3. Spectrum of PBL Strategies  
(DAU, 2005, p. 2-3) 
b. Definitions of Performance-based Logistics  
There are several definitions of PBL in the commercial sector and in the 
Department of Defense.  PBL is an overarching support strategy for procuring 
performance that takes advantage of the integrated logistics chains and 
public/private partnerships.  In layman’s terms, PBL buys performance—not just 
products or services.  The Department of the Army defines PBL in DoA PAM 700-56, 
Logistics Supportability Planning and Procedures in Army Acquisition as follows:  
Performance-based Logistics (PBL) is the mandated approach for 
executing affordable product support so that the accountability and 
responsibility for the integration of support elements are linked to 
specific warfighter performance requirements for weapon system 
readiness and operational capability. PBL is the delineation of output 
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sustainment and the assignment of responsibilities and implementation 
of incentives for the attainment of these goals/thresholds, and the 
overall life cycle management of system reliability, sustainability, and 
total ownership costs. The goal of PBL is to design and build a reliable 
system that will reduce the demand for logistics and [provide] a 
maintainable system that reduces the resources, such as manpower, 
equipment and time, required to provide the logistics support. (2006, p. 
1) 
c. Current Policy on Performance-based Logistics 
Current policies regarding PBL are being defined, as well as refined, as PBL 
continues to evolve in DoD-specific programs.   
The PM, as the Total Life Cycle Systems Manager (TLCSM), must 
ensure that the system, as designed, maintained, and modified, 
minimizes the demand for logistics. The PBL approach is based on 
[the] DOD managing and sharing risk with those who promise set 
levels of reliability and supportability. (DoA, 2006, p. 1) 
The Department of the Army in DoA PAM 700-56, Logistics Supportability 
Planning and Procedures in Army Acquisition (2006) identifies five levels of military 
objectives using PBL.  In other words, the PM will develop program metrics using the 
following levels of metrics: 
Operational availability—the percent of time that a weapon system is 
available for mission or the ability to sustain operations tempo. 
Operational reliability—the measure of a weapon system in meeting 
mission success objectives (percent of objectives met, by weapon 
system). Depending on the weapon system, a mission objective would 
be a sortie, tour, launch, destination reached, capability, and so on. 
Cost per unit usage—the total operating costs divided by the 
appropriate unit of measurement for a given weapon system. 
Depending on the weapon system, the measurement unit could be 
flight hour, steaming hour, launch, mile driven, and so on. 
Logistics footprint—the Government/contractor size or “presence” of 
logistics support required to deploy, sustain, and move a weapon 
system. Measurable elements include inventory/equipment, personnel, 
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Logistics response time—the period of time between when a logistics 
demand signal is sent and the time that demand is satisfied. “Logistics 
demand” refers to systems, components, or resources (including labor) 
required for weapon system logistics support. PBL metrics should 
support these desired outcomes. (DoA, 2006, p. 1) 
The DoD’s policy outlined in DoDD 5000.01 (2007) paragraph E1.1.17 states 
that under PBL, 
The PM shall develop and implement performance-based logistics 
strategies that optimize total system availability while minimizing cost 
and logistics footprint. Tradeoff decisions involving cost, useful service, 
and effectiveness shall consider corrosion prevention and mitigation. 
Sustainment strategies shall include the best use of public and private 
sector capabilities through government/industry partnering initiatives, in 
accordance with statutory requirements. (Department of Defense, 
2007, p. 7) 
The Department of Defense Instruction DoDI 5000.2, (2003) paragraph 
3.9.2.3 states, 
The PM shall work with the users to document performance and 
support requirements in performance agreements specifying objective 
outcomes, measures, resource commitments, and stakeholder 
responsibilities. (Department of Defense, 2007, p. 46) 
d. Background of Performance-based Logistics  
PBL is a work in progress that was mandated in September 2001 in the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) (Aldridge, 2002, p. 1), and initial guidance was 
stated in a memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense, E.C. Aldridge, Jr., 
dated February 13, 2002.  The memo states that the:  
QDR mandated implementation of PBL and modern business systems 
with appropriate metrics to compress the supply chain, eliminated non-
value added steps and improve readiness for major weapon systems 
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weapon systems, ensures that responsibilities are assigned, provides 
incentives for attaining these goals and facilitates the overall life cycle 
management of system reliability, supportability, and total ownership 
costs providing guidance on the application of PBL. (Aldridge, 2002, p. 
1) 
The memorandum required each service, in accordance with the “FY03 
Defense Planning Guidance and Change 1 to DoD 5000.2, [to] develop schedules to 
ensure implementation of Performance-based Logistics (PBL) on all new systems 
and ACAT I and II fielded systems” (p. 53).  In March 2003, a memorandum from the 
Under Secretary of Defense emphasized the importance of the use of PBL with Total 
Life-cycle Systems Management (TLCSM) (p. 97).  
Further, the DAU guidebook on PBL states that: 
TLCSM and PBL emphasize an early focus on sustainment within the 
system life cycle.  TLCSM is the implementation, management, and 
oversight, by the designated Program Manager (PM), of all activities 
associated with the acquisition, development, production, fielding, 
sustainment, and disposal of a DoD weapon system across its life 
cycle. (DAU, 2005, p. 2-1) 
In March 2004, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense issued a 
memorandum entitled Performance Based Logistics and Business Case Analysis.  
The memo promoted aggressive implementation of PBL and required services to 
complete a Business Case Analysis by September 30, 2006, on all new and fielded 
Acquisition Category (ACAT) I and II programs for application of PBL sustainment 
strategies (Wynne, 2004).  The memo also provided guidance to assist PMs in 
assessing the potential applications of PBL strategies to meet the September 2006 
deadline. 
Under direction from the Under Secretary of Defense, the Department of the 
Army issued the memorandum Performance Based Logistics (PBL) Business Case 
Analysis (BCA) Policy in August 2005.  This document provided the initial US Army’s 
policy for using BCAs in support of a best-value assessment of PBL support 
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e. Concept of Performance-based Logistics 
As stated earlier, there is no one-size-fits-all when it comes to PBL.  The 
Performance Based Logistics: A Program Manager’s Product Support Guide and 
DoA PAM 700-56, Logistics Supportability Planning and Procedures in Army 
Acquisition establish the guidelines for PMs, the Product Support Manager (PSM), 
and the product team to implement PBL.  In order to begin the PBL process, 
logistical requirements need to be identified and stated as expected results based on 
the warfighter requirements. The Department of the Army asserted, “The 
responsibility and accountability for meeting these expectations fall on the PM’s 
designated Product Support Integrator (PSI)” (DoA, 2006, p. 17). 
PBL arrangements establish clear lines of accountability for results based on 
warfighters’ expectations that are documented in a Performance-based Agreement 
(PBA). PMs use PBAs to establish overall PBL strategy.  This agreement 
establishes ranges of outcome performance with: 
Thresholds and objectives, and the target price (cost to the user) for 
each level of PBL capability. The agreement also delineates any 
constraints or boundary conditions and will reflect normal operations. 
(DAU, 2005, p. 3-17) 
“The specific PBL responsibilities are stated in PBAs between the PM and the 
user/warfighter, as well as between the PM and the PSI” (DoA, 2006, p. 17).  Figure 
4 provides a visual representation of PBAs and the interaction among the PM, 
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Figure 4. Performance-based Agreements  
(DAU, 2005, p. 3-17) 
The DoA PAM 700-56, Logistics Supportability Planning and Procedures in 
Army Acquisition, states as a minimum, PBL system support/sustainment 
management planning shall address: 
 Integrated supply chain segmented support by system or subsystems 
 Responsive relationships with the warfighter based on system 
readiness 
 Best-value support based on long-term and competitive arrangements 
with product-support providers (PSPs) and integrators (PSIs). 
 Continuous support performance monitoring based on high-level 
metrics such as operational availability 
 Product affordability and mission reliability 
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f. Success of Performance-based Logistics 
There are hundreds of Performance-based Logistics programs currently 
underway.  The following are some examples of successful Performance-based 
Logistics programs. “Program Managers (PMs) are encouraged to consider relevant 
examples for application to their own PBL efforts, and are also encouraged to 
contact the program offices’ Product Support Manager (PSM) for additional guidance 
or information” (DAU, 2005, p. 5-1). 
F/A-18E/F 
The single-seat F/A-18E and the two-seat F/A-18F Super Hornets 
perform a variety of missions, including  air superiority, day and night 
strike with precision-guided weapons, fighter escort, close air support, 
suppression of enemy air defense, maritime, reconnaissance, forward 
air controller, and tanker. The F/A-18E/F has 11 weapon stations, 
which allows for a significant degree of payload flexibility with the 
capability to carry a variety of both air-to-air and air-to-ground 
ordnance on one mission, including the complete complement of 
Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM). 
The F/A-18E/F Integrated Readiness Support Team (FIRST) PBL 
contract covers approximately 73 percent of F/A-18 E/F materiel 
support, including 3,889 E/F WRAs, 653 I-Level Repairables, 349 
Support Equipment Items, 130 Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) 
Consumables, and over 10,000 Non-DLA Consumables. The Naval 
Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) is a major Product Support 
Integrator (PSI), and Boeing is the PBL Contractor. DLA is the primary 
source for common consumables. Through the FIRST contracts, 
Boeing provides total aircraft support—including supply chain support, 
reliability improvements, obsolescence management, E/F squadron 
activation, technical publication, and support equipment management. 
Additionally, Boeing has commercial service agreements with all three 
Naval Air Depots (NADEPs) for depot-level repair. (DAU, 2005, p. 5-1) 
Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) is 
an airborne battle management, Command and Control (C2) platform. 
From a standoff position, the Modified 707-300, manned by a joint 
Army-Air Force crew, detects, locates, tracks, and targets hostile 
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secure data links to Air Force and Army command centers. Northrop-
Grumman is the prime contractor under a Total System Support 
Responsibility (TSSR) arrangement for Sustainment of JSTARS over a 
maximum contract period of 22 years. Warner-Robins Air Logistics 
Center (WRALC) performs core sustaining workloads (e.g., repair of 
prime mission equipment and system software maintenance) and other 
workloads (e.g., ground support software maintenance and various 
back shop functions) under a work-share partnership with Northrop-
Grumman. DLA is the primary provider for common Consumable parts 
and almost all JSTARS-unique consumable part. (DAU, 2005, p. 5-4) 
Naval Inventory Control Point: Aircraft Tires 
The Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) Aircraft Tires PBL 
contract transfers traditional Department of Defense (DoD) inventory 
management functions to the contractor, which will guarantee a level of 
tire availability versus physical inventory. Under this vehicle, the 
contractor is tasked to become the single supply chain integrator for 
Navy aircraft tires and is responsible for requirements forecasting, 
inventory management, retrograde management, stowage, and 
transportation. The contractor provides a full-service 24/7 service 
center with Web-based access. In addition, the contractor is committed 
to providing surge capability to support up to twice the normal monthly 
demand. Finally, the Navy expects to achieve significant 
transportation, warehousing, and inventory savings over the system life 
cycle. The performance benefit is 96% materiel availability during initial 
performance review with 8,000 fleet orders filled and zero backorders. 
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II. Background 
A. Global War on Terror (GWOT) and the Joint Improvised 
Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) 
In the early stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom, Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs) emerged as a leading threat to the safety of service members in Iraq.  Faced 
with the increased use of IEDs in both Iraq and Afghanistan, the Department of the 
Army established the Army IED Task Force in October 2003 (JIEDDO, n.d.).  This 
task force reached out to its sister services, academia, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) research laboratories, and private-sector companies to develop Counter-IED 
(C-IED) technologies and C-IED training equipment.  
Based on the early successes of this task force, then-Deputy Secretary of 
Defense Paul Wolfowitz transformed the task force now known as the Joint IED 
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) (JIEDDO, n.d.).  “The Joint IED Defeat Organization 
shall focus (lead, advocate, coordinate) all Department of Defense actions in support 
of Combatant Commanders’ and their respective Joint Task Forces’ efforts to defeat 
improvised explosive devices as weapons of strategic influence” (n.d.).  In February 
2006, JIEDDO became a permanently manned entity by DoD Directive 2000.19E 
(JIEDDO, n.d.). JIEDDO continues to reach out to its partners to support the 
Combatant Commanders in the C-IED fight by funding, developing, and fielding new 
technologies to identify and disrupt IED networks.  Since a large number of 
personnel deployed in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) are Army 
personnel, the Department of the Army established a Product Manager office to 
provide lifecycle support for these new and emerging technologies. 
B. Product Manager IED Defeat/Protect Force 
The Army established Product Manager Office PM IED Defeat/Protect Force 
(PM IEDD/PF), chartered September 2007, to manage all of the Army’s C-IED 
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Project Manager Close Combat Systems (PM CCS). Both PM IEDD/PF and PM 
CCS are subsets of the Joint Munitions and Lethality Life Cycle Management 
Command, and all three offices are headquartered at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ.  PM 
IEDD/PF’s mission is: 
To ensure the development, production, fielding and sustainment of 
the Army’s non-traditional, IED defeat and protect force capabilities 
using accelerated acquisitions strategies to provide the warfighter with 
the capability to win the war on IEDs (and other global threats) against 
an adaptive asymmetrical enemy. (JM&L Public Affairs Office, 2007) 
PM IEDD/PF products vary widely from simplistic items such as Command 
Wire Neutralization (Wolf Collar) to the more complex systems of Laser-induced 
Breakdown Spectroscopy (LIBS) explosives detection. PM IEDD/PF mainly focuses 
on items and technologies that are defined through the Joint Urgent Operational 
Needs Statements (JUONS).  JIEDDO responds to these JUONS requirements by 
linking potential material solutions and managers with the resources (funding) in 
order to get the items to the Soldiers in the shortest amount of time possible. Several 
of the more prominent items the PM manages that are direct responses to the 
JUONS process and that JIEDDO has funded include Rhino, Cyclone, Schonstedt, 
and the Self-Protection Adaptive Roller Kit System (SPARKS)—the largest product 
managed by PM IEDD/PF.  Due to the late Fiscal Year (FY) 07 PM Charter, PM 
IEDD/PF was unable to complete the required documentation in order to apply for 
the Program Objective Memorandum cycle for FY 08-13 and is working towards the 
cycle for FY 10-15.   
Currently, PM IEDD/PF is supporting the SPARKS program through several 
Regional Support Centers (RSC) located throughout Iraq and Afghanistan. Each of 
these RSCs is responsible for all aspects of the system—from fielding all levels of 
maintenance concerning the end-item, to system component upgrades, to training 
new users of the equipment.  These RSCs, denoted by stars on the map, are 





















Figure 5. Iraq Regional Support Centers  
(Borjes, 2009, p. 5) 
The number one threat to Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan is the Improvised 
Explosive Device (IED), which has been responsible for almost 40% of US 
casualties in Operation Iraqi Freedom.  There are numerous ways to activate IEDs—
ranging from crude timers to command wires to remote activation via a cell phone.  
However, one of the most common activation methods is a pressure-sensitive trigger 
that relies on targets to activate the IED by rolling over it themselves, killing 
everyone in the vehicle (Borjes, 2008).  
The SPARK program is a niche, urgent procurement in order to satisfy a Joint 
Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS).  The overall mission need of this 
program is to provide the troops in Iraq, fighting in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), 
and in Afghanistan, fighting in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), with a device to 
trigger the mines before they are killed by driving over them.  The Self-protective 
Adaptive Roller Kit, or SPARK, is the device that connects to the front of the vehicle. 
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for "standoff protection" to trigger explosive devices before they can do the most 
harm to the vehicle and its occupants.  Soldiers realized in late 2004 that there was 
a need to detonate mines before their vehicle physically ran over the mine and all 
occupants inside were killed, so they improvised and created Sharp Knife (Figure 6) 
and Sharp Edge (Figure 7). 
 
 
Figure 6. Sharp Knife Mine Roller  
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Figure 7. Sharp Edge Mine Roller  
(PM CCS, 2009) 
C.  SPARKS OIF 
 
Figure 8. RG-31 with Track-width Rollers (OIF) Installed  
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Figure 9. Full-width RG-31 with Track-width Rollers (OIF) Installed  
(PM IEDD/PF Product Office, 2009, p. 0002-7) 
With a special need and a Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement 
(JUONS) issued from Multi-National Corps Iraq (MNCI) in March 2007, PM IED 
Defeat and Tank and Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering 
Command (TARDEC) were able to give the Soldier a mine-roller system that created 
the standoff they needed. 
The OIF variant of the SPARK System has a roller mounted on the front of 
the vehicle that rolls the route ahead of the vehicle wheels. A second roller mounted 
on the rear of the vehicle rolls the route left between the wheels of the vehicle to 
make it safe for following vehicles. The rear roller houses a hydraulic Power Pack to 
control the front and rear rollers. The Power Pack is electrically driven from the 
vehicle's 24v system.  Specific characteristics of the OIF system are displayed in 
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D. SPARKS OEF 
 
Figure 10. MRAP Vehicle with Forward Full-width Rollers (OEF) Installed  
(DoA, 2009, p. 002-3) 
The OIF SPARK Roller was not designed for use in the rugged terrain of 
Afghanistan; its inadaptability rendered our soldiers vulnerable to attack.  With a 
special need and a JUONS, PM IED Defeat and TARDEC replaced the OIF SPARK 
Roller in March 2007 with the Full-width Light-weight Mine Rollers (FWLWMR) in 
future missions conducted in Afghanistan. 
The OEF variant of the SPARK System (the electro-hydraulic power pack) is 
located behind the track-width rollers and also serves to control the entire roller 
assembly. Specific characteristics of the OEF system are displayed in Table 4 
(Appendix B). 
Both SPARK variants serve to provide sufficient pressure to detonate mine 
fuses and to ensure that the rollers stay in contact with the route at speed; a 
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E.  Differences between the Two Models 
The OIF track-width rollers have four wheels on each castering roller bank.  
The full-width configuration can be covered with either the rear rollers or a forward, 
center roller bank.  OEF track-width rollers have three wheels on each castering 
roller bank. The full-width configuration is covered with a forward, center roller bank 
only.  Both SPARK variants (OIF and OEF) use an identical forward, center roller, 
which implements a six-wheel castering roller bank (PM IEDD/PF Product Office, 
2009, p. 0002-16).  Figure 11 depicts the evolution from improved areas in current, 
fielded SPARKS systems to future concepts.  
 
Unclassified//For Official Use Only
SPARK Evolution
OIF
• Fielded 308 Track Width (TW) Sparks On Multiple Platforms
• Fielded 37 Full Width (FW) Sparks On M939 Family 
OEF
• Fielded 6 TW Sparks For An Operational Assessment
• Laterally Transferred 5 TW SPARK From OIF
• Fielding 33 Interim TW SPARKS (11 On The Ground Now) 
and 2 OEF unique
¾ Initial Pressure Down Capability
¾Manual Standoff (Extensions)
¾ Documented Successes – 85 Events In OIF And 10 Events 
In OEF
¾ Countless Number Of Lives Saved And Significant Materiel 
Savings
¾ Very Repairable
¾ Requirement – JUONS CC-0236/0258 
Fielded Capability
OIF
• Full Width Front Capability For 800 Systems
• Currently Does Not Have Down Pressure Capability
• Projected Fielding Will Begin Jan 09 IAW Corps Distro Plan
• Completing MRAP Testing At YPG
OEF
• Requirements For 300 Systems
• Unique Theater Specific Capabilities for a Narrower Full Width Front that has 
Increased Mobility And Manual Steering
• SPARK OEF Testing on going
• Projected Fielding Will Begin JAN 09 IAW Corps Distro Plan
• Procurement thru limited competition
• 46 OEF Specific Rollers on the Ground Now
• Configurable To Most Tactical Wheel Vehicle Platforms (One Track      
Platform)
¾ Investigating Configuration for Down Pressure Capability
Currently Fielding
• Improved Down Pressure To Combat Emerging Threats
• External Integrated Power Source
• Power Draw Reduction
• Reliability Enhancements
• Quick Jettison Capability
Improvement Focus Areas
• Varying Configurations
• Down Pressure Options Of High, Low, And Float
• Automatic Track Width Adjustments
• Linked Steering




Continued Improvements to Stay Ahead of Evolving Threat   
Figure 11. SPARKS Evolution  
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F.  Procurement Method and Type Used 
Based on the procurement history in the commercial sector and the market 
research that was conducted, the PM determined that the Mine Roller System meets 
the definition of a commercial item in accordance with the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation (FAR) Part 2.101 (General Services Administration, 2005).  The Mine 
Roller System meets the definition of a commercial item because it is an adaptation 
of the Roller System customarily found in the commercial construction industry.  The 
Mine Roller System was acquired using the acquisition policies and procedures set 
out in FAR Part 12, “Acquisition of Commercial Items” (2005).  The decision to use 
sole source was based on the results of market research, which showed Pearson to 
be the only contractor with the ability to produce and deliver the SPARK without 
unacceptable delays. 
G.  Market Research 
Market research was conducted via a sources-sought notice to Federal 
Business Opportunities (http://www.fbo.gov) and Subject-matter Expert (SME) 
research (trade and internet sources).  In accordance with FAR Part 10, and FAR 
Part 12.101 (a) (General Services Administration, 2005), market research was 
conducted in support of their determination.   
Based on the procurement history, knowledge of the item, and the market 
research that was conducted—the contracting legal officer determined that the Mine 
Roller System met the definition of a commercial item in FAR Part 2.101.  The 
Pearson Mine Roller System has been sold to the general public via humanitarian 
organizations, which are funded with monies from private citizens.  The Pearson 
Mine Roller Systems are offered to the general public in the form of a Product  
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Catalog, which is accessible via the Web at http://www.pearson-eng.com/.  Pearson 
customarily offers training to the general public for all Pearson products; therefore, 
the requirement for CONUS training meets the definition of a commercial service.  
The Mine Roller System was acquired using the acquisition policies and procedures 
set out at FAR Part 12, “Acquisition of Commercial Items.” 
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In order to conduct a detailed analysis of the SPARKS program, we first must 
identify the current practices used by the PM to support this system.  Although the 
SPARKS program is still considered a niche item, we have identified several areas 
of potential cost savings for the PM to consider.  These will be addressed in the 
following sections of this chapter.  Currently, the PM office utilizes an Acquisition 
Strategy plan, developed in 2007, to purchase repair parts as initial spare parts 
packages that coincide with the delivery of the SPARKS systems into the OIF 
theater of operations. Additionally, the PM’s plan established CLS as the mechanism 
for support for the entire system—from the initial receipt of the equipment to the 
major overhaul of damaged equipment.  To determine if any realized cost savings 
existed, we analyzed elements of the ILS, focusing specifically on Maintenance 
Planning, Support Equipment, and Supply Support in order to provide substantive 
recommendations for the PM.  The data consists of 48 weekly inventory reports for 
each of the 471 parts for the SPARKS system.  We utilized the data and additional 
information provided by the PM to identify if any cost savings could be determined 
based on high parts usage, analysis of high-dollar parts, and analysis of current 
spare parts ordering (FOB Kits).  Additionally, the data provided from the PM and 
insights and recommendations from the current CLS contractor will allow for the 
creation of a mixture between an organically maintained Soldier Maintenance Kit 
(SMK) and contractor-maintained items. 
B. Research Questions Addressed 
1. Can Cost Savings Be Realized for the SPARKS Program? 
In order to answer the primary research question, our analysis focuses on the 
elements of Integrated Logistics Support outlined in Chapter I.  Our analysis utilizes 
the data provided to accomplish the following:  
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 Determine which spare parts are considered as High-usage Parts 
(20% or higher),  
 Determine which spare parts are High-dollar Parts ($100+) based on 
the PM recommendations and show the allocation of funds spent on 
spare parts (Gullifer, 2009),  
 Determine the potential of establishing a Soldier Maintenance Kit 
(10/20 level organic maintenance) (Harrison, 2009), 
 Compare the current plan the PM utilizes to order spare parts and 
provide a different set of ordering criteria (Forward Operating Base) 
based on spare-parts analysis, and 
 Provide the PM office with a forecasted fiscal-year ordering model with 
safety stocks incorporated for both the Soldier Maintenance Kit (SMK) 
and the contractor-maintained RSC.  
Upon completion of data compilation, the researchers determined the usage 
quantity for each of the 471 individual parts; we subsequently expressed each of 
these statistics as a percentage.  This data identifies that a significant portion 
(89.38%) of the 471 parts were used less than or equal to 15% of the time compared 
to the total quantities of the spare parts purchased from early 2007 through August 
2009.  Figure 12 indicates that of the 471 spare parts comprising the OIF SPARKS 
system, 285 of those parts showed zero demand over the 48-week data-collection 
period.  Figure 12 also shows the significance of having a large inventory of spare 
parts on-hand to support the SPARKS system. 
 
Figure 12. Parts Usage Compiled into Percentage Bins 
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a. High-usage Parts 
High-usage parts are defined as those parts totaling a usage value of 21% or 
higher when compared to the quantities purchased from program inception to 
August 2009.  The 21% value was determined by the PM office as a starting point 
for the analysis of the SPARKS program since no significant analysis has been 
performed prior to this effort (Gullifer, 2009).  Table 1 identifies the 17 parts that met 
the established criterion, as well as the critical parts the PM Office should monitor 
closely.  The data provides insight into parts that may require redesign, 
remanufacturing techniques, and/or higher order quantities for future spare-parts 
packages.  An example of a major redesign/remanufacture might include part 
numbers ND8994 and PE26426.  ND8994 represents the original part design, and 
PE26426 represents the improved design.  While serving as a forward element of 
the PM office, one of the authors of this study (MAJ Snipes) worked closely with the 
receiving units and the Field Service Representatives (FSRs) in order to determine if 
a redesign of part number ND8994 was needed due to its high-usage/failure rate 
during deployment from September 2007–March 2008.  Based on the data provided 
from OIF, Pearson—along with support from Government engineers—determined 
that a redesign was warranted in order to mitigate some of the initial part failures.  
Although this redesign did improve the life of the part, it still shows a high level of 
usage.  
From this analysis, the researchers identified two outliers: PE24966 and 
PE25097 usage percentages of 191% and 223%, respectively. One possible 
explanation for these high percentages could be that the PM IEDD/PF instructed the 
FSRs to remove as many salvageable spare parts from battle-damaged equipment 
as possible in order to reduce the downtime for systems.
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Table 1. High-usage Parts 
















KP00461 AXLE ASSEMBLY KIT 349  154 195 45% 
ND0763 SCREW CAP SOCKET 1330  394 936 30% 
ND8994 SUSPENSION UNIT TYPE 
DW-A.70 x 200 
1187  532 655 45% 
PE24569 LOWER PIVOT FRAME 32  22 10 69% 
PE24622 SPRAY GUARD FRAME - 
LH 
110  36 74 33% 
PE24626 SPRAY GUARD FRAME - 
RH 
110  30 80 28% 
PE24690 INDICATOR ROD 
ASSEMBLY 
483  99 384 21% 
PE24731 REAR BOOM CYLINDER 24  5 19 21% 
PE24813 PIN - UPPER BOOM / 
PIVOT 
255  55 200 22% 
PE24907 SCRAPER 349  71 278 21% 
PE24966 ADJUSTABLE (STAMPED 
AS PE24965) 
22  42 -20 191% 
PE24977 SPRAY FLAP 201  137 64 69% 
PE25035 HOSE, F/R,  F STEER QR 
- R STEER QR, A 
30  9 21 30% 
PE25097 JACK ASSEMBLY, FRONT 31  69 -38 223% 
PE25766 TRAILING ARM PLATE 674  142 532 22% 
PE25851 JACK 503  125 378 25% 
PE26426 SUSPENSION UNIT TYPE 
DW-A.70 x 200 
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Figure 13 shows the total funds allocation for the parts used versus the 
overall parts purchased.  Additionally, the figure shows that out of the $18.1 million 
utilized to purchase spare repair parts for the SPARKS system, $16.2 million 
remains in unused inventory.  Again, this figure provides the PM visibility for spare 
parts usage, allowing the PM to determine if his or her initial assumptions were valid 
or whether they require updating. To determine the best fit for future spare parts 




Figure 13. Spare Parts Purchased versus Spare Parts Remaining 
b. High-dollar Parts 
PM IEDD/PF identified a high-dollar part as any part that has an individual 
purchase price of $100 or greater (Gullifer, 2009).  Figure 14 shows a detailed view 
of the $18.1 million spent on spare parts, of which 95% was spent on parts costing 
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spare-parts-used data and high-usage parts data will potentially allow the PM office 
to identify cost savings by reducing inventory levels.  If the identified high-dollar part 
has a low-usage rate, then future purchases of that particular spare part should not 












Figure 14. Total Cost of High-dollar Parts 
c. Potential Changeover for FOB Kit Ordering 
As previously stated, PM IEDD/PF utilizes an acquisition strategy plan to 
order spare repair parts based on the delivery schedule of the SPARKS systems.  
From the data provided by the PM office and Pearson Engineering, and based on 
the current system for ordering FOB Kits, we determined that during the FY09 time 
period, the PM spent a total of approximately $9.3 million on spare parts.  Figure 15 
displays the breakdown and overall cost figures for the purchases of the FOB Kits.  
Table 5 (Appendix B) shows the current policy for ordering FOB Kits. 
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Figure 15. FY09 FOB Kit Spare Parts Purchased  
(via Current Acquisition Strategy Plan) 
From the historical usage data compiled, we determined a potential cost 
savings of approximately $8.3 million for the PM Office.  Figure 16 depicts the cost 
comparison of all spare part purchases for FOB Kits based on the current acquisition 
strategy plan versus those same FOB Kit  parts being purchased based on the 
quarterly average use, normalized to one year. We examined the FOB Kit spare 
parts, identified the usage for the parts, and compared the parts to those ordered 
under the current plan. We determined the PM office is continually spending money 
on excess inventory based on the current plan. We determined the average 
quarterly usage levels for the same FOB Kit spare parts based on the historical 
usage levels from the data provided. As a result, it is clear that the spare parts in the 
FOB Kits with low usage levels should not be ordered in the future. Based on the 
analysis, the PM office could have spent less than $1 million on spare parts—versus 
the $9.2 million they did spend for the FOB Kit repair parts.  Table 6 (Appendix B)  
displays the FOB Kit New Ordering Policy from quarterly use based on the high-use 
analysis combined with the current policy for ordering FOB Kits. 
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Figure 16. FY09 Comparison of Current Acquisition Strategy Plan  
versus Historical Usage Normalized to FY09 
d. Soldier Maintenance Kit (SMK) 
In an effort to reduce CLS costs, PM IEDD/PF requested that this research 
focus on the repair of spare parts at the organic maintenance level; if this was 
considered a feasible solution, then the research could focus on determining 
quantity and type of spare parts that should be managed by a third-party logistics 
provider (3PLP), i.e., Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). After conferring with the PM 
office representatives and the contractor providing the actual maintenance of the 
systems, we have determined that a portion of the 471 individual spare parts that 
comprise the SPARKS system could transfer to an organic-level maintenance team 
(Harrison, 2009; Gullifer, 2009).  This determination was made by reviewing each 
individual part with the contractor; in this way, we could support or deny whether a 
typical organic maintenance person, with the current battalion-level maintenance 
toolkits already in the Army inventory, could replace the part.  Table 7 (Appendix B) 
shows the parts discussed in this conference.  The parts not identified as organic-
level maintenance items will remain as items for contractor repair.  The collected 
data provided by the PM was compiled into the total parts used for each spare part 
included in the SMK.  Since the time period of collected data accounted for 
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approximately 11 months, we normalized the data to a full year.  The values shown 
in Table 7 (Appendix B), in the column titled “Qty to Purchase for DLA Stock Next FY 
Safety Stock @ 12.5%,” also represent a 12.5% safety stock included, based on the 
recommendations from PM IEDD/PF (Gullifer, 2009).  The quantity levels indicated 
in this column represent the amount of spare parts that could potentially be 
managed by a 3PLP, the DLA. Additionally, the PM stated that the RSC should 
maintain a certain quantity of each of the SMK parts but on a reduced level when 
compared to the DLA stock levels.  PM IEDD/PF recommended that the contractor 
maintain at each RSC approximately 25% stock level of the DLA-managed items, 
including the safety stock, to ensure responsive operations throughout the theater of 
operations.  These quantities are represented by the column titled “Qty to Purchase 
for RSC Safety Stock at 25%.”  From the parts previously identified as high usage, 
41% of those comprise parts included in the SMK. 
2. Does PM IEDD/PF’s Current Logistics Management Plan 
Represent a Best Allocation of Resources?  
From the 10 ILS elements, we analyzed numerous aspects surrounding 
Maintenance Planning, Support Equipment, and Supply Support.  The objective of 
maintenance planning is to provide the warfighter with the best equipment possible 
at the lowest LCC by identifying, planning, resourcing, and implementing sound 
maintenance concepts (DoA, 2009, p. 13).  Currently, PM IEDD/PF uses a CLS 
contract, Firm-Fixed-Price for Time and Materials, for all maintenance actions. 
Because SPARKS is a rapid-acquisition program from a JUONS requirement, CLS 
maintenance was paramount to ensure rapid delivery and support of the system to 
enhance the warfighters’ capabilities. As the program continues to mature, other 
maintenance options (rather than purely CLS) should be explored.  We examined 
the following maintenance options: a mixture of organic and contractor maintenance 
options, required manpower skill levels, levels of repair, repair times, and 
maintenance-support equipment needs. Based on firsthand knowledge we garnered 
and the interviews conducted with the PM office and the contractors, we determined 
that a mixture of organic and contractor maintenance options was a feasible solution 
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and would not require the addition of a new Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). 
The current 63B MOS (Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic) could perform some of the 
repairs for the SPARKS system, given that the soldier was trained, had a Technical 
Manual (TM) explaining the repairs, or both.  Once trained, the mechanic could also 
train/oversee the individual unit operators of the SPARKS system in repairs, leaving 
the mechanic to perform other maintenance duties as required.  Based on these 
aspects, we were able to determine that by establishing differing levels of repair, the 
operating unit would experience a decrease in repair times for the systems.  
Currently, if a SPARKS is deemed Non-mission Capable (NMC), the unit must 
decide how best to get the system back to an RSC. Once the SPARKS was at the 
RSC, the contractors would repair the system and inform the unit the system had 
been repaired and was ready to pick up. If the unit could not return the damaged 
equipment to an RSC, then the contractor would be required to travel to the unit 
location, conduct the inspection, determine the repair parts needed, and, finally, fix 
the system.  This process could take several weeks due to numerous factors such 
as airlift capability, size of the repair parts needed (are they transportable by hand or 
do they require shipping?), unit operational tempo, and so on. If the unit had the 
repair parts necessary to bring the SPARKS back to FMC status, most of the 
downtime from the example could be eliminated.  Additionally, a mixture of organic 
and contractor maintenance should reduce the contractor’s logistics footprint 
throughout the theater.   
The objective for Support Equipment is to provide the necessary equipment to 
sustain the system and, therefore, ensure the system is available to warfighters 
when they need it (DoA, 2009, p. 13).  Initially, PM IEDD/PF completed an excellent 
analysis of support equipment required for SPARKS.  From their analysis, they 
designed the SPARKS system such that no specialized repair equipment was 
needed. The system could be repaired utilizing current Army assets, the Common 
Number One Toolkit.  Also, the system can be transported by the most common 
Army assets: Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTV), Palletized Load System 
(PLS), Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Truck (HEMTT), Fixed-wing aircraft (C-130 
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and higher).  The system can also be sling-loaded by current rotary wing assets. 
Again, based on the PM’s initial assessment, they were able to ensure that the 
SPARKS would not require any specialized test equipment such as Test, 
Measurement and Diagnostic Equipment (TMDE).  From their analysis, PM IEDD/PF 
has potentially reduced the overall LCC concerning support equipment needs for 
SPARKS. As previously mentioned, two-thirds of a system LCC occurs during the 
operations and sustainment phase. Any reduction in specialized support equipment 
will contribute significant savings over the total life of the system.   
The objective of Supply Support is to implement management actions to 
acquire all classes of supplies needed to ensure the system is in the best 
operational condition to support the warfighters’ mission at the lowest possible LCC 
(DoA, 2009, p. 13). PM IEDD/PF identified early in the response to the JUONS that 
a certain quantity of Battle-damaged Replacement Systems and initial quantities 
spare repair parts would be required. Resourced from JIEDDO, the PM created the 
initial repair parts packages (which are still in use) based on the size of the Forward 
Operating Base (FOB) where the RSC would be potentially located. For example, 
the RSC located in Balad, Iraq, is considered a large FOB, and, therefore (as shown 
in Table 5 in Appendix B), the PM would order quantities of each of the identified 
repair parts deemed appropriate for a large FOB.  Once acquired, the repair parts 
would be issued to the contractors as Government-furnished Equipment (GFE), and 
the contractors would be required to account for and maintain a 90-day stock level 
for all repair parts (Bean, 2008, p. 5).  For any parts that fall below the 90-day stock 
level, the contractor must request replenishment through the PM IEDD/PF ILS 
support office (Bean, 2008, p. 5).  Since the SPARKS system was developed in 
response to an urgent requirement, the PM office requested that the system be 
issued a Non-standard Line-item Number (NS-LIN) in order to maintain 100% 
property accountability.  This NS-LIN enabled the PM office to transfer the systems 
to the Theater-provided Equipment (TPE) list quickly and into the hands of the 
warfighter in a smooth and efficient manner. 
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IV. Conclusions and Recommendations 
A. Conclusion 
Throughout this project, we focused on current ILS and PM practices to 
ascertain if any cost savings could be determined for the SPARKS program.  As a 
result of our analysis and ongoing discussions with the PM office throughout this 
project, the PM is implementing new spare-part ordering policies and will continue to 
strive to implement other recommendations for current and future support of the 
SPARKS program.  
Logistics is an ongoing process.  Support requirements for weapon systems 
change almost daily.  To accommodate these changes, the DoD and PMs are 
continuously trying to improve the process based on PBL, CLS support, Organic 
support, or simpler ideas of logistics analysis.  There is no single best way to 
optimize logistics support.  Making a measurable impact on any program generally 
involves a combination of all these processes.  After reviewing all the information 
collected and analyzed for this project, we believe that an overarching support 
analysis approach, as previously mentioned, will optimize the logistics support for 
SPARKS.  From this analysis, we believe that the recommendations presented 
below will ultimately save the PM money for the SPARKS program, regardless of the 
operating environment.   
Key Takeaway Points 
 Effective tracking of high-usage parts can yield repair parts cost 
savings and identify potential redesign/reengineer efforts for specific 
parts. 
 High-dollar parts must be monitored, as they could result in significant 
cost drivers for the program over the lifecycle of the system when 
those parts begin to fail. 
 PM IEDD/PF should complete a Business Case Analysis (BCA) for 
PBL and CLS. The Program Office should compare the results to 
determine the best value option for the SPARKS program. 
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 Bulk ordering of spare parts by FOB Kits should be replaced with 
quarterly forecasts based on historical part usage analysis. 
 The Soldier Maintenance Kit is a viable option for implementing a 
hybrid mix of organic and contractor support that could generate 
additional savings for the SPARKS program. 
B.  Recommendations 
1. Conduct a Business Case Analysis on the Implementation of 
Performance-based Logistics (PBL) versus Maintaining 
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) 
As mentioned previously, PM IEDD/PF currently utilizes CLS for support of 
the SPARKS program.  When the SPARKS system was first fielded, the CLS 
concept was the most effective means of supporting this rapid-acquisition program. 
Now that the logistical support for the SPARKS systems has matured, CLS may no 
longer be the best/most effective option for logistical support of the program.  
As noted in several GAO reports and DoD policies, PBL is mandatory for all 
Army Category (ACAT) I and II programs.  The Department of the Army still 
considers SPARKS a niche item, and it does not meet the requirements for ACAT I 
or ACAT II programs. Classification as a niche item presents several complicating 
issues for the PM. The DoD still encourages other non ACAT I and II programs to 
institute PBL where applicable. In order for the PM to determine if PBL would be 
beneficial for the SPARKS program, the PM office must conduct a Business Case 
Analysis for the system.  Although conducting a BCA is outside the scope of this 
project, we recommend that the Program Office conduct its own BCA based on the 
elements defined in DoD Instruction Economic Analysis for Decision Making (DoD, 
1995, pp. 7-12). 
2. Continue to Monitor High-usage Parts for Potential Savings and 
High-dollar Parts for Potential Future Support Issues 
Based on our analysis of available data, there appears to be more potential 
cost savings that could be retrieved if the PM focused attention on high-usage parts 
over high-dollar parts.  However, high-dollar parts should be continuously monitored, 
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as they could become a support issue and have significant impact on repair parts 
costs as the systems age.  From the analysis of the data collected for this project, 
the PM Office should apply the techniques1 described previously in the analysis 
section of this report.  This will enable the PM to determine if the high-usage part 
requires reengineering due to part failures, or if the part is an initial-issue item.  By 
continuing to monitor the high-usage parts, the PM can make better-informed 
decisions regarding future spare parts purchases, possibly reducing excess 
inventory.  The insight the PM gains from applying these principles to the OIF 
Theater will provide a path forward to logistical support for the SPARKS in the OEF 
Theater or for any future contingency. 
3. Reformulate Current Repair Parts Ordering Kits to an Ordering 
System Based on Quarterly Spare Parts Consumption 
Bulk ordering based on FOB size was the original approach for spare parts 
ordering.  Since SPARKS started as a rapid-acquisition initiative, purchasing spare 
parts by bulk packages was a sound strategy.  Now that the program has historical 
data, a better approach for spare parts management could be achieved via the 
following elements: 
 Review historical parts usage data to help forecast future spare parts 
purchases. 
 Conduct an analysis of the forecasted spare parts purchases with 
current on-hand quantities in order to determine the optimal order 
quantity. 
 For future contracts, establish individual Contract Line-item Numbers 
(CLINs) for each of the parts that comprise the SPARKS.  
 Update the Acquisition Strategy Plan to reflect the CLIN ordering 
structure. 
                                            
1 These techniques include: monitoring the identified high-usage parts and coupling the information 
with an analysis to determine if redesign/reengineering is required; monitoring quantities of spare 
parts available in theater and potentially adjusting spare parts package orders as necessary; and 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 60 -=  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 If the SPARKS program moves from a niche item to a Program of 
Record (POR), the PM should establish Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite 
Quantity (ID/IQ) contracts. 
4. Institute the Soldier Maintenance Kit (SMK) 
As discussed in the analysis chapter, the contractor currently performs all 
maintenance activities for the SPARKS.  This study found that a mixture of CLS and 
organic support would be a viable option for the SPARKS program.  Even though the 
SPARKS program is still considered a niche item, the PM office can still provide an 
interim level of support given that the following elements are addressed: 
 The PM, in conjunction with the Original Equipment Manufacturer 
(OEM) and support contractor, must create a unit-level maintenance 
manual that describes the maintenance procedures for identifying 
faults and the necessary steps to correct those faults based on the 
parts identified in the SMK. 
 The PM should consider creating an offline ordering account with the 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) in order to help the program transition 
from solely contractor maintenance support to a mixture of contractor 
and organic maintenance support. This will allow units to order repair 
parts through the DLA, therefore reducing inventory levels in theater at 
each of the RSCs. 
 As described in the analysis chapter, although the DLA would manage 
a certain quantity of the SMK inventory levels, each of the RSCs would 
also maintain specific quantities of the SMK items for urgent logistical 
support to the operating units. 
 If the SPARKS Program matures into a POR, then the nonstandard 
part numbers created through the offline account will allow the DLA to 
transition those parts into National Stock Numbers (NSNs). 
 The assignment of NSNs will allow any unit maintenance team to order 
the required spare parts through any DoD supply system.  This will 
transition spare parts ordering responsibilities from the PM Office to 
the units maintaining and employing the SPARKS. 
C.  Further Research 
Although we based this analysis solely on the OIF Theater, the same type of 
data analysis is applicable to OEF (Afghanistan) to determine a better logistics 
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support approach.  Additionally, as contingency operations in Iraq continue to 
decrease and the need for the SPARKS system increases in OEF, the PM could 
transfer a majority of the spare parts inventory in Iraq to Afghanistan.  Finally, the 
PM should conduct (or sponsor) further research into the costs and benefits 
associated with contractor personnel levels and determine if additional cost savings 
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APPENDIX A.  Elements of Integrated Logistics 
Support 
Table 2. Elements of Integrated Logistics Support  
(From DoA, 2009, p. 15) 
Element Objective Description 
Maintenance planning Identify, plan, resource, and 
implement maintenance 
concepts and requirements to 
ensure the best possible 
equipment/capability is 
available when the warfighter 
needs it at the lowest possible 
LCC. 
Establishes maintenance concepts and 
requirements for the life of the system to 
include hardware and software. It includes, 
but is not limited to, levels of repair, repair 
times, testability requirements, support 
equipment needs, training and TADSS, 
manpower skills, facilities, interservice, 
organic and contractor mix of repair 
responsibility, site activation, development 
of preventive maintenance programs using 
reliability centered maintenance, 
sustainment, PBL planning and post-
production software support, etc. This 
element has a great impact on the planning, 




Identify, plan, resource and 
acquire personnel, civilian 
and military, with the grades 
and skills required: a) to 
operate equipment, to 
complete the missions, to 
effectively fight or support the 
fight, to win our nation’s wars; 
b) to effectively support the 
Soldier, and to ensure the 
best capability is available for 
the warfighter when needed. 
Involves the identification and acquisition of 
personnel (military and civilian) with the 
skills and grades required to operate, 
maintain, and support systems over their 
lifetime. Early identification is essential. If 
the needed manpower is an additive 
requirement to existing manpower levels of 
an organization, a formalized process of 
identification and justification must be made 
to higher authority. 
Supply support Identify, plan, resource and 
implement management 
actions to acquire repair 
parts, spares, and all classes 
of supply to ensure the best 
equipment/capability is 
available to support the 
warfighter or maintainer when 
it is needed at the lowest 
possible LCC. 
Consists of all management actions, 
procedures, and techniques necessary to 
determine requirements to acquire, catalog, 
receive, store, transfer, issue and dispose 
of spares, repair parts, and supplies. This 
means having the right spares, repair parts, 
and all classes of supplies available, in the 
right quantities, at the right place, at the 
right time, at the right price. The process 
includes provisioning for initial support, as 
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Element Objective Description 
Support equipment Identify, plan, resource and 
implement management 
actions to acquire and support 
the equipment (mobile or 
fixed) required to sustain the 
operation and maintenance of 
the system to ensure that the 
system is available to the 
warfighter when it is needed 
at the lowest LCC. 
Consists of all equipment (mobile or fixed) 
required to support the operation and 
maintenance of a system. This includes but 
is not limited to ground handling and 
maintenance equipment, trucks, air 
conditioners, generators, tools, metrology 
and calibration equipment, and manual and 
automatic test equipment. During the 
acquisition of systems, program managers 
are expected to decrease the proliferation of 
support equipment into the inventory by 
minimizing the development of new support 
equipment and giving more attention to the 
use of existing government or commercial 
equipment. 
Technical data Identify, plan, resource and 
implement management 
actions to develop and 
acquire information: 
a) to operate, maintain, and 
train on the equipment to 
maximize its effectiveness 
and availability; 
b) to effectively catalog and 
acquire spare/repair parts, 
support equipment, and all 
classes of supply; 
c) to define the configuration 
baseline of the system 
(hardware and software) to 
effectively support the 
warfighter with the best 
capability at the time it is 
needed. 
Represents recorded information of 
scientific or technical nature, regardless of 
form or character (such as equipment 
technical manuals and engineering 
drawings), engineering data, specifications, 
standards and Data Item Descriptions 
(DID). Technical manuals (TMs), including 
Interactive Electronic Technical Manuals 
(IETMs) and engineering drawings, are the 
most expensive and probably the most 
important data acquisitions made in support 
of a system. TMs and IETMs provide the 
instructions for operation and maintenance 
of a system. IETMs also provide integrated 
training and diagnostic fault isolation 
procedures. Address data rights and data 
delivery as well as use of any proprietary 
data as part of this element. 
 
Training and training 
support 
Plan, resource, and 
implement a cohesive 
integrated strategy to train 
military and civilian personnel 
to maximize the effectiveness 
of the doctrine, manpower 
and personnel, to fight, 
operate, and maintain the 
equipment throughout the 
lifecycle. As part of the 
strategy, plan, resource, and 
implement management 
actions to identify, develop, 
and acquire Training Aids  
Devices Simulators and 
Simulations (TADSS) to 
maximize the effectiveness of 
Consists of the policy, processes, 
procedures, techniques, Training Aids 
Devices Simulators and Simulations 
(TADSS), planning and provisioning for the 
training base—including equipment used to 
train civilian and military personnel to 
acquire, operate, maintain, and support a 
system. This includes New Equipment 
Training (NET), institutional, sustainment 
training and Displaced Equipment Training 
(DET) for the individual, crew, unit, 
collective, and maintenance through initial, 
formal, informal, on-the-job training (OJT),  
and sustainment proficiency training. 
Significant efforts are focused on NET, 
which (in conjunction with the overall 
training strategy) shall be validated during 
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Element Objective Description 
the manpower and personnel 
to fight, operate, and sustain 
equipment at the lowest LCC. 
system evaluation and test at the individual, 




Identify, plan, resource, and 
acquire facilities, hardware, 
software, documentation, 
manpower and personnel 
necessary for planning and 
management of mission-
critical computer hardware 
and software systems. 
Encompass the facilities, hardware, 
software, documentation, manpower, and 
personnel needed to operate and support 
mission-critical computer hardware/software 
systems. As the primary end-item, support 
equipment, and training devices increase in 
complexity, more and more software is 
being used. The expense associated with 
the design and maintenance of software 
programs is so high that one cannot afford 
not to manage this process effectively. It is 
standard practice to establish some form of 
computer resource working group to 
accomplish the necessary planning and 
management of computer resources 
support. Computer programs and software 
are often part of the technical data that 
defines the current and future configuration 
baseline of the system necessary to 
develop safe and effective procedures for 
operation and maintenance of the system. 
Software technical data comes in many 
forms to include, but not limited to, 
specifications, flow/logic diagrams, 
Computer Software Configuration Item 
definitions, test descriptions, operating 
environments, user and maintainer 
manuals, and computer code. 
Facilities Identify, plan, resource, and 
acquire facilities to enable 
training, maintenance and 
storage to maximize 
effectiveness of system 
operation and the logistic 
support system at the lowest 
LCC. Identify and prepare 
plans for the acquisition of 
facilities to enable responsive 
support for the warfighter. 
Consists of the permanent and semi-
permanent real property assets required to 
support a system—including studies to 
define types of facilities or facility 
improvements, location, space needs, 
environmental and security requirements, 
and equipment. It includes facilities for 
training, equipment storage, maintenance, 







Identify, plan, resource, and 
acquire 
packaging/preservation, 
handling, storage and 
transportation (PHST) 
requirements to maximize 
availability and usability of the 
materiel—to include support 
The combination of resources, processes, 
procedures, design, considerations, and 
methods to ensure that all system, 
equipment, and support items are 
preserved, packaged, handled, and 
transported properly—including 
environmental considerations, equipment 
preservation for the short and long storage, 
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Element Objective Description 
items whenever they are 
needed for training or 
mission. 
and transportability. Some items require 
special environmentally controlled, shock-
isolated containers for transport to and from 
repair and storage facilities via all modes of 
transportation (land, rail, air, and sea). 
Design 
influence/interface 
Participate in the systems 
engineering process to impact 
the design from its inception 
throughout the lifecycle, 
facilitating supportability to 
maximize the availability, 
effectiveness and capability of 
the system at the lowest LCC. 
Logistics-related design influence 
parameters include the following: 
–Reliability, availability, maintainability 
(RAM) (RAM) 
–Human factors 
–Soldier/machine/software/interface/   
  usability 
–System safety 
–Survivability and vulnerability 
–Hazardous material management 
–Environmental quality factors such as 
assessment of air, water, and noise 
pollution. 





These logistics-related design influence 
parameters are expressed in operational 
terms rather than inherent values and 
specifically relate to system readiness 
objectives and support costs of the system. 
Design interface really boils down to 
evaluating all facets of an acquisition, from 
design to support and operational concepts 
for logistical impacts to the system itself 
and the logistic infrastructure. Design 
interface includes developing the system to 
operate in a net-centric environment (for 
example, CLOE that complies with the 
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Table 3. SPARKS OIF  
(From PM IEDD/PF Product Office, 2009, p. 0002-16) 
Full-width Rollers: 
Weight ........................................................... 3,005 kg (6,620 lbs) 
Total width .................................................... 314.5 cm (124 in) 
Front roller width .......................................... 98.5 cm (39 in) 
Center gap ..................................................... 117.5 cm (46 in) 
Rear roller width ........................................... 147.5 cm (58 in) 
Front Roller: 
Height............................................................ 125 cm (49 in) 
Length ........................................................... 240 cm (95 in) 
Width............................................................. 240 cm (95 in) 
Weight ........................................................... 1,225 kg (2,700 lbs) 
Rear Roller with Hydraulic Power Pack: 
Height............................................................ 125 cm (49 in) 
Length ........................................................... 240cm (95 in) 
Width............................................................. 240 cm (95 in) 
Weight ........................................................... 1,225 kg (2,700 lb) 
5-Ton Vehicle Mounting Brackets (Full-width): 
Length attached to vehicle ............................ 420 cm (14.04 ft) 
Length beyond front of vehicle ..................... 220 cm (7 ft) 
Length beyond behind vehicle ...................... 220 cm (7 ft) 
Width............................................................. 330 cm (10.78 ft) 
Width beyond vehicle.................................... 81 cm (2.67 ft) 
Weight ........................................................... 46 kg (500 lbs) 
HMMWV Vehicle Mounting Bracket (Track -width): 
Length beyond vehicle .................................. 220 cm (7 ft) 
Width beyond vehicle (w/ Frag Kit 5 armor). 60 cm (1.9 ft) 
Weight ........................................................... 148 kg (325 lb) 
RG-31 MPV Mounting Bracket (Track-width): 
Length beyond vehicle .................................. 220 cm (7 ft) 
Width beyond vehicle.................................... 110 cm (3.5 ft) 
Weight ........................................................... 159 kg (350 lbs) 
BFV Mounting Bracket (Track-width): 
Length attached to vehicle ............................ 878 cm (28.83 ft) 
Length beyond vehicle .................................. 236 cm (7.75 ft) 
Width beyond vehicle.................................... 36 cm (1.17 ft) 
Weight ........................................................... 150 kg (330 lb) 
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Table 4. SPARKS OEF  
(From PM IEDD/PF Product Office, 2009, p. 0002-17) 
Complete Assembly: 
Height (with Indicator Rods) ........................ 200.2 cm (78.8 in) 
Length ........................................................... 393 cm (154.7 in) 
Width............................................................. 274.3 cm (108 in) 
Weight ........................................................... 2,629 kg (5,797 lbs) 
Track-width Roller: 
Height (without Indicator Rod)..................... 132.4 cm (52.1 in) 
Length (without Power Pack)........................ 208.3 cm (82 in) 
Length (with Power Pack)............................. 238.8 cm (94 in) 
Width............................................................. 274.3 cm (107 in) 
Weight ........................................................... TBD 
Total width .................................................... 274.3 cm (108 in) 
Track-width roller bank width (each)............ 75.2 cm (29.6 in) 
Center gap ..................................................... 123.9 cm(48.8 in) 
Front Center Roller Width (with mud guards) 175.3 cm (69 in) 
5-Ton Vehicle Mounting Brackets (Full-width): 
Length attached to vehicle ............................ 420 cm (14.04 ft) 
Length beyond front of vehicle ..................... 220 cm (7 ft) 
Length beyond behind vehicle ...................... 220 cm (7 ft) 
Width............................................................. 330 cm (10.78 ft) 
Width beyond vehicle.................................... 81 cm (2.67 ft) 
Weight ........................................................... 46 kg (500 lb) 
HMMWV Vehicle Mounting Bracket (Track-width): 
Length beyond vehicle .................................. 220 cm (7 ft) 
Width beyond vehicle (w/ Frag Kit 5 armor). 60 cm (1.9 ft) 
Weight ........................................................... 148 kg (325 lbs) 
RG-31 MPV Mounting Bracket (Track-width): 
Length beyond vehicle .................................. 220 cm (7 ft) 
Width beyond vehicle.................................... 110 cm (3.5 ft) 
Weight ........................................................... 159 kg (350 lbs) 
BFV Mounting Bracket (Track-width): 
Length attached to vehicle ............................ 878 cm (28.83 ft) 
Length beyond vehicle .................................. 236 cm (7.75 ft) 
Width beyond vehicle.................................... 36 cm (1.17 ft) 
Weight ........................................................... 150 kg (330 lbs) 
Weight of vehicle with roller......................... 35,471 kg (78,200 lbs) 
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APPENDIX B.  Spare Parts Ordering Tables 
Table 5. FOB Kit Current Ordering Policy 
PART DESCRIPTION Small Qty Medium Qty Large Qty 
CS0348/14.0 HARNESS RCU TO VPU 0 0 2 
CS0351/11.0 HARNESS POWER I/V FUSE BOX TO 
MPU 
0 0 2 
CS0354/9.0 HARNESS FUSE BOX TO VPU 0 0 2 
CS3228/2.2 HARNESS VALVE PACK TO STEERING 
CYLINDER 
0 0 2 
ND0048 SCREW HEX M8X25L 150 200 350 
ND0050 SCREW HEX M10X16L 200 250 500 
ND0065 SCREW HEX M20X50L GRD 8.8 P 100 100 200 
ND0072 NUT HEX FULL M6 1 1 25 
ND0075 HEX NUT, FULL, M12 1 1 25 
ND0076 NUT HEX  FULL M16 25 75 100 
ND0078 WASHER SINGLE COIL M3 1 1 50 
ND0081 WASHER SINGLE COIL SPRING M6 25 25 25 
ND0082 WASHER SINGLE COIL SPRING M8 75 150 250 
ND0083 WASHER SINGLE COIL SPRING M10 75 100 200 
ND0084 WASHER SINGLE COIL M12 STL P 30 50 100 
ND0085 WASHER SINGLE COIL SPRING M16 30 50 100 
ND0091 WASHER FLAT M10 STL. P. 1 1 100 
ND0092 WASHER FLAT M12 25 75 100 
ND0093 WASHER FLAT M16 STL. P 5 10 100 
ND0114 SCREW HEX M12X50L 60 150 300 
ND0128 WASHER FLAT M8 30 75 100 
ND0149 SCREW HAMMER DRIVE No.6 x 1/4 15 25 100 
ND0154 SPLIT KEY RING 30MM O/D 100 200 300 
ND0285 PIN 100 150 200 
ND0289 SCREW HEX M12x20L 1 1 25 
ND0293 PIN, SAFETY LINCH 50 100 200 
ND0294 PIN, SAFETY LINCH - 7.5mm DIA 100 200 300 
ND0295 PIN, SAFETY LINCH 25 100 150 
ND0306 NUT SELF-LOCKING M12 50 100 500 
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PART DESCRIPTION Small Qty Medium Qty Large Qty 
ND0312 HEX NUT NYLOC M10 50 250 400 
ND0315 SCREW HEX M10X50L 1 1 25 
ND0332 BONDED SEAL 3/8"BSP (SELF 
CENTERING) 
1 1 25 
ND0336 ADAPTOR 3/8" BSP M-3/8" BSP M 15 25 50 
ND0548 BOLT HEX M16X150L 50 75 100 
ND0549 NUT HEX FULL M10 STL P 25 50 100 
ND0578 SCREW HEX M12X35L 1 0 25 
ND0763 SCREW CAP SOCKET 50 100 500 
ND0923 BOLT HEX M12x50L 25 75 75 
ND0930 TEE G 3/8" MALE 25 50 100 
ND0973 SCREW HEX M16X50L 5 10 25 
ND0979 WASHER FLAT M3 1 1 25 
ND1002 SCREW HEX HD M8X30 GRD 8.8 ZINC 
PLT 
150 600 600 
ND10224 QUICK RELEASE COUPLING MALE 
3/8"BSP 
5 10 25 
ND10225 QUICK RELEASE COUPLING FEMALE 
3/8" BSP 
5 10 25 
ND10235 SPACER 100 300 300 
ND10248 SPACER 200 800 800 
ND1207 M20 NYLOC NUT 100 150 200 
ND1209 NUT NYLOC M8 TYPE P GRD 8 ZINC 
PLT 
100 600 700 
ND2026 ADAPTER M/M 1/2" - 3/8" 1 1 5 
ND2312 ELBOW 90DEG 3/8M X 3/8F 1 1 25 
ND2627 BOLT HEX M10x70L GRD 8.8 150 500 500 
ND2646 LOCKING COLLAR 25 50 100 
ND2691 SCREW HEX M30 X 120L 10 25 50 
ND2926 BONDED SEAL 3/8" BSP (SELF 
CENTERED) 
25 25 100 
ND2942 BULKHEAD CONN G 3/8 5 10 25 
ND3209 ADAPTOR 3/8 BSP M - 3/8 BSP F 5 15 25 
ND3315 WASHER BONDED S/C G3/8" NITRILE 
STL Z/PLT 
2 6 10 
ND3325 GREASE NIPPLE STRAIGHT M8 X 1.25P 50 100 400 
ND4359 LOCTITE 243 (THREADLOCK) 2 6 10 
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PART DESCRIPTION Small Qty Medium Qty Large Qty 
ND4418 WASHER SERRATED SAFETY M20 100 500 700 
ND4452 M8x25 HEX HEAD SCREW Gr8.8 25 50 100 
ND4780 BOLT HEX HEAD M6 X 60 LG GR8.8 ZP 1 1 5 
ND4862 TEE 3/8 BSP M,M ON RUN, F ON 
BRANCH 
2 6 10 
ND5080 WASHER FLAT M8 FORM C, ZP 5 15 25 
ND5705 BOLT HEX M12X110 L 20 50 75 
ND5917 SCREW HEX M10x12L 65 100 150 
ND6553 SWIVEL ELBOW (COMPACT) 3/8" BSP 
M/F, 
25 50 75 
ND6758 BUSH 44 O/D X 50 I/D X 30 LONG 
GRADE S 
10 25 50 
ND6759 BUSH 55 O/D X 50 I/D X 50 LONG 
GRADE S 
25 100 500 
ND6760 BUSH 75 O/D X 70 I/D X 40 LONG 
GRADE S 
5 15 25 
ND6761 BUSH 105 O/D X 100 I/D X 60 LONG 
GRADE S 
5 20 25 
ND6763 THRUST WASHER 90 O/D X 72 I/D X 6 
THK 
25 50 100 
ND6764 THRUST WASHER 130 O/D X 102 I/D X 6 
THK 
15 25 50 
ND6772 BOLT HEX M10x65L 25 50 100 
ND6989 SCREW PAN HD SLOT M5x12L  GRD A2 25 50 100 
ND7040 BOLT HEX M20 X 120L 1 1 5 
ND7095 SCREW SKT CAP M20x50L 100 200 400 
ND7165 THRUST WASHER 150 O/D X 130 I/D X 6 
THK 
1 1 5 
ND7342 SPLIT KEY RING 16MM O/D 1 1 5 
ND7425 CHAIN 13 DIA LONG LINK 1 1 5 
ND7532 ADAPTER 1/2 BSP MALE - MALE 1 1 5 
ND7630 NUT NYLOC M12 15 25 50 
ND7942 CHAIN 1/2" FISHING LONG-LINK 1 1 5 
ND7973 BUFFER 5 10 25 
ND8847 M6 GREASE NIPPLE 1 1 10 
ND8849 TEST POINT 1/4" BSP 25 50 100 
ND8896 ACCUMULATOR 4 LTR 5 10 25 
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PART DESCRIPTION Small Qty Medium Qty Large Qty 
ND8897 ADAPTOR PIECE 1-1/4" BSP x 3/8 BSP 
M/M 
5 10 25 
ND8898 ACCUMULATOR SADDLE/CLAMP ASSY 5 10 25 
ND8915 FLAT WASHER M8  FORM G 1 1 5 
ND8953 GREASE NIPPLE COVER 50 100 400 
ND8992 MEDIUM DUTY SAFETY WASHER M12 100 250 280 
ND9038 1/2 BSPP PLUG (C/W O RING SEAL)50 1 1 5 
ND9052 PIN SAFETY LINCH 1 1 5 
ND9212 BALL JOINT END 30 50 100 
ND9218 5/8" ROUND PIN SHACKLE (3.25 Tonne) 1 1 5 
ND9222 NUT - M16 - 14mm SPHERICAL SEAT 100 500 700 
ND9276 SCREW HEX HD M6X8 GRD 8.8 ZINC 
PLT 
25 50 100 
ND9330 SWIVEL ROD END 45 BORE M42 X 3P 5 10 25 
ND9345 NUT HEX FULL M30 10 25 50 
ND9384 WASHER, BELLEVILLE D501832 20 50 80 
ND9730 SEAL, BONDED DOWTY 1 1/4" 25 75 100 
PE20611 LANYARD - OVER CENTRE STOP 100 200 500 
PE21252 10.5mm LINCHPIN/LANYARD ASSY 
(TURNBUCKLE) 
5 10 25 
PE24550 CROSS BEAM  2 10 15 
PE24567 UPPER PIVOT FRAME 1 5 10 
PE24569 LOWER PIVOT FRAME 1 5 10 
PE24587 LOWER BOOM 1 5 10 
PE24606 PIN - LOWER PIVOT FRAME MOUNTING 50 100 300 
PE24608 PIN - UPPER BOOM / PIVOT FRAME 50 100 200 
PE24611 ACCUMULATOR COVER 2 5 10 
PE24614 SUSPENSION FRAME  10 15 35 
PE24620 PIN - SUSPENSION FRAME 60 130 200 
PE24631 STOP LINK 1 1 5 
PE24646 DIRT GUARD 5 25 50 
PE24681 PIN STEER LOWER BOOM 5 10 25 
PE24690 INDICATOR ROD ASSEMBLY 25 50 75 
PE24695 PIN - UPPER PIVOT FRAME MTG 5 25 50 
PE24712 PIN - LIFT CYLINDER/LOWER BOOM 2 6 10 
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PART DESCRIPTION Small Qty Medium Qty Large Qty 
PE24713 PIN - LIFT CYLINDER/UPPER BOOM 2 6 10 
PE24735 PIN - TRUNNION 1 1 5 
PE24736 PIN - TRANSPORT 1 1 5 
PE24813 PIN - UPPER BOOM PIVOT 5 10 25 
PE24896 WASHER M12 x 4 THICK 25 50 100 
PE24907 SCRAPER 1 1 5 
PE24964 TIE BAR - FIXED LENGTH 25 50 100 
PE24965 TIE BAR BODY 25 50 100 
PE24974 CASTOR BRACKET  25 100 200 
PE24975 WHEEL & TYRE 100 200 500 
PE24978 EDGE STRIP 1 1 5 
PE24979 CLEVIS END L.H. 25 50 100 
PE24980 CLEVIS END R.H. 25 50 100 
PE24981 MODIFIED WASHER M30 FLAT 5 10 25 
PE25040 HOSE, F, LIFT CYL - ACCUMR, A 25 50 100 
PE25058 HOSE, F, LIFT CYL LINK 75 100 200 
PE25122 ADAPTOR, FILLING, TRACK WIDTH 
ROLLER 
1 1 1 
PE25123 ASSY, PRESSURE GAGE (GFE TO 
REPAIR SITE) 
1 1 1 
PE25811 WASHER M10 X 4 THICK 25 50 75 
PE25830 TOP BOOM 1 1 10 
PE25841 STEER CYLINDER (NON SENSING) 1 1 2 
PE25851 JACK, REAR 25 50 75 
PE25864 SHACKLE 1 1 5 
PE25865 SHACKLE PIN 1 1 5 
PE25866 STEER CYLINDER SENSING 1 1 2 
PE25870 WARNING PLATE 3 5 5 
PE25947 WASHER M8 X 4 THICK 20 50 50 
PE25952 LIFT CYLINDER 10 25 50 
PE25966 CENTRE TUBE ASSY 25 75 100 
PE26099 JACK, FRONT 5 20 25 
PE26120 PIN 10 15 50 
PE26163 2' EXTENDER FRAME 0 15 5 
PE26166 ROLLER BRACKET LINK 1 0 15 
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PART DESCRIPTION Small Qty Medium Qty Large Qty 
PE26182 1' EXTENDER FRAME 0 0 5 
PE26192 FRAME - FULL WIDTH FRONT ROLLER 1 5 10 
PE26194 YOKE, CENTRE CYLINDER 2 10 20 
PE26199 PIN, CYLINDER CLEVIS 5 20 25 
PE26204 PIN, CYLINDER, CENTRE ROLLER 5 20 25 
PE26206 11.5 LINCH PIN/LANYARD ASSY 5 15 25 
PE26217 SUSPENSION FRAME 2 10 10 
PE26220 WEIGHT, 10KG 5 25 50 
PE26232_LH SPRAYGUARD, CENTRE ROLLER_LH 10 25 50 
PE26232_RH SPRAYGUARD, CENTRE ROLLER_RH 10 25 50 
PE26235 SPRAY FLAP 25 75 100 
PE26236 SPRAY FLAP 25 75 100 
PE26243 EDGE STRIP (620 LONG) 10 25 50 
PE26244 EDGE STRIP (300 LONG) 10 25 50 
PE26306 CYLINDER, LIFT, CENTRE ROLLER 5 10 25 
PE26317 PIN - UPPER FRAME / BOOM 15 25 50 
PE26372 SPACER 25 50 150 
PE26373 DISK, ROTOR 5 10 25 
PE26374 PLATE, LOWER 5 10 25 
PE26375 PLATE, TOP 5 10 25 
PE26377 FRICTION PAD 5 25 50 
PE26381 PLATE, UPPER 5 10 25 
PE26426 SUSPENSION UNIT TYPE DW-A.70 x 200 100 150 250 
PE26468 SPRING - SPRAY GUARD 25 50 100 
PE26469-LH SUPPORT, SPRAY GUARD, LH 25 50 100 
PE26469-RH SUPPORT, SPRAY GUARD, RH 25 50 100 
PE26486 RUBBER - SPLASH GUARD 50 100 300 
PE26510 CLAMP PLATE, SHORT, SPRAY GUARD 25 50 75 
PE26511 CLAMP PLATE, LONG, SPRAY GUARD 25 50 75 
PE26512 CLAMP STRIP, SHORT, SPRAY GUARD 25 50 75 
PE26513 CLAMP STRIP, LONG, SPRAY GUARD 5 25 50 
PE26537 SLINGING DATA PLATE 2 6 10 
PE26854 BRACKET, RHINO 2 10 25 
PE26901 AXLE/HUB ASSEMBLY 50 100 500 
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PART DESCRIPTION Small Qty Medium Qty Large Qty 
PE26922 CASTOR COLLAR 50 70 100 
PE26931 HOSE, F TOP BOOM QRA-F CTR LIFT 
CYL 
2 6 10 
PE26932 HOSE , ACCUMULATOR - BULKHEAD 
CONN. 
2 6 10 
PE30003 BANJO 3/8" BSP 90 DEG 5 10 25 
PE30043 TRAILING ARM PLATE 25 50 100 
PE30081 12 mm TEE COUPLING 2 6 10 
PE30082 STEEL TUBE 2 6 10 
PE30083 STEEL TUBE 2 6 10 
PE30084 3/8" BSP MALE - 18 mm MALE   
ADAPTOR 
2 6 10 
PE30191 PIN (CENTRE ROLLER, TOWING) 5 25 50 
PE30192 CAP PLATE (TOWING) 5 10 25 
PE30460 CASTOR COLLAR 5 10 25 
PE30908 FRONT PIVOT (Gen 3) 25 50 100 
PE30921 PIN - UPPER BOOM 25 50 100 
PE30955 PIN CROSS BEAM/FRAME 25 100 200 
PE30956 WASHER, LOCK 25 50 75 
PE30957 NUT, LOCK 25 50 75 
PE30965 SPACER 25 50 75 
PE30978 WASHER FLAT M42 5 25 50 
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Purchased FY 09 






CS0348/14.0 HARNESS RCU TO VPU  1 $22,310.08 $22,310.08 
CS0351/11.0 
HARNESS POWER I/V 
FUSE BOX TO MPU  1 $22,938.76 $22,938.76 
CS0354/9.0 
HARNESS FUSE BOX TO 
VPU  0 $5,234.28 $0.00 
CS3228/2.2 
HARNESS VALVE PACK 
TO STEERING CYLINDER  0 $4,005.84 $0.00 
ND0048 SCREW HEX M8X25L  58 $280.00 $46.40 
ND0050 SCREW HEX M10X16L  4 $380.00 $3.20 
ND0065 
SCREW HEX M20X50L 
GRD 8.8 P  7 $680.00 $23.80 
ND0072 NUT HEX FULL M6  0 $14.58 $0.00 
ND0075 HEX NUT, FULL, M12  5 $164.16 $60.80 
ND0076 NUT HEX  FULL M16  5 $612.00 $30.60 
ND0078 
WASHER SINGLE COIL 
M3  0 $14.56 $0.00 
ND0081 
WASHER SINGLE COIL 
SPRING M6  0 $13.50 $0.00 
ND0082 
WASHER SINGLE COIL 
SPRING M8  16 $104.50 $7.04 
ND0083 
WASHER SINGLE COIL 
SPRING M10  9 $67.50 $3.24 
ND0084 
WASHER SINGLE COIL 
M12 STL P  4 $50.40 $2.24 
ND0085 
WASHER SINGLE COIL 
SPRING M16  2 $32.40 $0.72 
ND0091 
WASHER FLAT M10 STL. 
P.  30 $26.52 $15.60 
ND0092 WASHER FLAT M12  0 $48.00 $0.00 
ND0093 
WASHER FLAT M16 STL. 
P  0 $25.30 $0.00 
ND0114 SCREW HEX M12X50L  18 $459.00 $32.40 
ND0128 WASHER FLAT M8  3 $36.90 $1.08 
ND0149 
SCREW HAMMER DRIVE 
No. 6 x 1/4  0 $64.40 $0.00 
ND0154 
SPLIT KEY RING 30MM 
O/D  38 $240.00 $30.40 
ND0285 PIN  32 $4,248.00 $604.16 
ND0289 SCREW HEX M12x20L  0 $15.12 $0.00 
ND0293 PIN, SAFETY LINCH  16 $2,905.00 $265.60 
ND0294 
PIN, SAFETY LINCH - 
7.5mm DIA  43 $5,748.00 $823.88 
ND0295 PIN, SAFETY LINCH  20 $2,700.50 $392.80 
ND0306 NUT SELF-LOCKING M12  15 $260.00 $12.00 
ND0312 HEX NUT NYLOC M10  46 $154.00 $20.24 
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Purchased FY 09 






ND0315 SCREW HEX M10X50L  1 $7.56 $0.56 
ND0332 
BONDED SEAL 3/8"BSP 
(SELF CENTERING)  0 $21.60 $0.00 
ND0336 
ADAPTOR 3/8" BSP M-
3/8" BSP M  4 $374.40 $33.28 
ND0548 BOLT HEX M16X150L  2 $675.00 $12.00 
ND0549 
NUT HEX FULL M10 STL 
P  0 $70.00 $0.00 
ND0578 SCREW HEX M12X35L  2 $30.16 $4.64 
ND0763 SCREW CAP SOCKET  99 $533.00 $162.36 
ND0923 BOLT HEX M12x50L  0 $126.00 $0.00 
ND0930 TEE G 3/8" MALE  2 $3,881.50 $88.72 
ND0973 SCREW HEX M16X50L  0 $41.60 $0.00 
ND0979 WASHER FLAT M3  0 $7.56 $0.00 
ND1002 
SCREW HEX HD M8X30 




3/8"BSP  0 $5,741.60 $0.00 
ND10225 
QUICK RELEASE 
COUPLING FEMALE 3/8" 
BSP  0 $7,952.00 $0.00 
ND10235 SPACER  0 $1,470.00 $0.00 
ND10248 SPACER  0 $1,296.00 $0.00 
ND1207 M20 NYLOC NUT  11 $405.00 $19.80 
ND1209 
NUT NYLOC M8 TYPE P 
GRD 8 ZINC PLT  0 $336.00 $0.00 
ND2026 ADAPTER M/M 1/2" - 3/8"  0 $62.02 $0.00 
ND2312 
ELBOW 90DEG 3/8M X 
3/8F  1 $531.36 $39.36 
ND2627 
BOLT HEX M10x70L GRD 
8.8  47 $483.00 $39.48 
ND2646 LOCKING COLLAR  2 $353.50 $8.08 
ND2691 SCREW HEX M30 X 120L  0 $1,672.80 $0.00 
ND2926 
BONDED SEAL 3/8" BSP 
(SELF CENTERED)  5 $90.00 $6.00 
ND2942 BULKHEAD CONN G 3/8  0 $313.60 $0.00 
ND3209 ADAPTOR 3/8 BSP M   4 $398.70 $70.88 
ND3315 
WASHER BONDED S/C 
G3/8" NITRILE STL Z/PLT  0 $11.88 $0.00 
ND3325 
GREASE NIPPLE 
STRAIGHT M8 X 1.25P  7 $1,485.00 $37.80 
ND4359 
LOCTITE 243 
(THREADLOCK)  0 $2,126.88 $0.00 
ND4418 
WASHER SERRATED 
SAFETY M20  31 $4,082.00 $194.68 
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M8x25 HEX HEAD 
SCREW Gr8.8  2 $157.50 $3.60 
ND4780 
BOLT HEX HEAD M6 X 60 
LG GR8.8 ZP  1 $8.12 $2.32 
ND4862 
TEE 3/8 BSP M,M ON 
RUN, F ON BRANCH  0 $307.44 $0.00 
ND5080 
WASHER FLAT M8 FORM 
C, ZP  0 $295.20 $0.00 
ND5705 BOLT HEX M12X110 L  0 $153.70 $0.00 
ND5917 SCREW HEX M10x12L  6 $365.40 $13.92 
ND6553 
SWIVEL ELBOW 
(COMPACT) 3/8" BSP 
M/F,  2 $2,949.00 $78.64 
ND6758 
BUSH 44 O/D X 50 I/D X 
30 LONG GRADE S  0 $2,444.60 $0.00 
ND6759 
BUSH 55 O/D X 50 I/D X 
50 LONG GRADE S  3 $20,200.00 $193.92 
ND6760 
BUSH 75 O/D X 70 I/D X 
40 LONG GRADE S  9 $640.80 $256.32 
ND6761 
BUSH 105 O/D X 100 I/D X 
60 LONG GRADE S  5 $4,146.00 $829.20 
ND6763 
THRUST WASHER 90 O/D 
X 72 I/D X 6 THK  26 $1,246.00 $370.24 
ND6764 
THRUST WASHER 130 
O/D X 102 I/D X 6 THK  2 $4,069.80 $180.88 
ND6772 BOLT HEX M10x65L  0 $126.00 $0.00 
ND6989 
SCREW PAN HD SLOT 
M5x12L  GRD A2  0 $70.00 $0.00 
ND7040 BOLT HEX M20 X 120L  14 $35.00 $140.00 
ND7095 
SCREW SKT CAP 
M20x50L  99 $2,842.00 $803.88 
ND7165 
THRUST WASHER 150 
O/D X 130 I/D X 6 THK  0 $784.00 $0.00 
ND7342 
SPLIT KEY RING 16MM 
O/D  0 $5.60 $0.00 
ND7425 CHAIN 13 DIA LONG LINK  1 $344.96 $98.56 
ND7532 
ADAPTER 1/2 BSP MALE 
- MALE  1 $37.52 $10.72 
ND7630 NUT NYLOC M12  1 $81.00 $1.80 
ND7942 
CHAIN 1/2" FISHING 
LONG-LINK  3 $137.76 $118.08 
ND7973 BUFFER  0 $414.40 $0.00 
ND8847 M6 GREASE NIPPLE  1 $53.52 $8.92 
ND8849 TEST POINT 1/4" BSP  3 $8,428.00 $288.96 
ND8896 ACCUMULATOR 4 LTR  1 $72,693.60 $3,634.68 
ND8897 
ADAPTOR PIECE 1-1/4" 
BSP x 3/8 BSP M/M  0 $2,816.80 $0.00 
ND8898 
ACCUMULATOR 
SADDLE/CLAMP ASSY  0 $7,936.00 $0.00 
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FLAT WASHER M8  
FORM   10 $11.48 $32.80 
ND8953 GREASE NIPPLE COVER  36 $495.00 $64.80 
ND8992 
MEDIUM DUTY SAFETY 
WASHER M12  19 $567.00 $34.20 
ND9038 
1/2 BSPP PLUG (C/W O 
RING SEAL)50  1 $43.12 $12.32 
ND9052 PIN SAFETY LINCH  4 $125.30 $143.20 
ND9212 BALL JOINT END  5 $6,818.40 $378.80 
ND9218 
5/8" ROUND PIN 
SHACKLE (3.25 Tonne)  4 $813.54 $929.76 
ND9222 
NUT - M16 - 14mm 
SPHERICAL SEAT  87 $3,900.00 $522.00 
ND9276 
SCREW HEX HD M6X8 
GRD 8.8 ZINC PLT  0 $42.00 $0.00 
ND9330 
SWIVEL ROD END 45 
BORE M42 X 3P  0 $4,069.60 $0.00 
ND9345 NUT HEX FULL M30  0 $302.60 $0.00 
ND9384 
WASHER, BELLEVILLE 
D501832  0 $780.00 $0.00 
ND9730 
SEAL, BONDED DOWTY 1 
1/4"  0 $740.00 $0.00 
PE20611 
LANYARD - OVER 




ASSY (TURNBUCKLE)  0 $1,184.80 $0.00 
PE24550 CROSS BEAM   4 $276,121.98 $81,813.92 
PE24567 UPPER PIVOT FRAME  0 $18,906.88 $0.00 
PE24569 LOWER PIVOT FRAME  6 $94,532.48 $70,899.36 
PE24587 LOWER BOOM  0 $132,345.28 $0.00 
PE24606 
PIN - LOWER PIVOT 
FRAME MOUNTING  34 $73,872.00 $11,162.88 
PE24608 
PIN - UPPER BOOM / 
PIVOT FRAME  7 $83,895.00 $3,355.80 
PE24611 ACCUMULATOR COVER  2 $8,281.72 $1,948.64 
PE24614 SUSPENSION FRAME   2 $147,460.80 $9,830.72 
PE24620 
PIN - SUSPENSION 
FRAME  1 $110,268.60 $565.48 
PE24631 STOP LINK  3 $4,936.82 $4,231.56 
PE24646 DIRT GUARD  1 $9,467.20 $236.68 
PE24681 
PIN STEER LOWER 
BOOM  9 $3,207.20 $1,443.24 
PE24690 
INDICATOR ROD 
ASSEMBLY  25 $54,816.00 $18,272.00 
PE24695 
PIN - UPPER PIVOT 
FRAME MTG  1 $14,984.00 $374.60 
PE24712 
PIN - LIFT 
CYLINDER/LOWER  1 $1,571.40 $174.60 
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PIN - LIFT 
CYLINDER/UPPER BOOM  1 $1,621.80 $180.20 
PE24735 PIN - TRUNNION  0 $3,472.98 $0.00 
PE24736 PIN - TRANSPORT  2 $1,466.92 $838.24 
PE24813 
PIN - UPPER BOOM 
PIVOT  14 $6,248.80 $4,374.16 
PE24896 WASHER M12 x 4 THICK  6 $1,046.50 $71.76 
PE24907 SCRAPER  18 $735.14 $3,780.72 
PE24964 TIE BAR - FIXED LENGTH  12 $38,010.00 $5,212.80 
PE24965 TIE BAR BODY  0 $39,049.50 $0.00 
PE24974 CASTOR BRACKET   2 $2,057,276.00 $25,320.32 
PE24975 WHEEL & TYRE  90 $984,832.00 $221,587.20 
PE24978 EDGE STRIP  7 $2,614.78 $5,229.56 
PE24979 CLEVIS END L.H.  6 $12,845.00 $880.80 
PE24980 CLEVIS END R.H.  6 $12,845.00 $880.80 
PE24981 
MODIFIED WASHER M30 
FLAT  3 $142.40 $21.36 
PE25040 
HOSE, F, LIFT CYL - 
ACCUMR, A  1 $34,034.00 $388.96 
PE25058 HOSE, F, LIFT CYL LINK  3 $150,825.00 $2,413.20 
PE25122 
ADAPTOR, FILLING, 
TRACK WIDTH ROLLER  1 $282.72 $188.48 
PE25123 
ASSY, PRESSURE GAGE 
(GFE TO REPAIR SITE)  1 $615.00 $410.00 
PE25811 WASHER M10 X 4 THICK  10 $1,158.00 $154.40 
PE25830 TOP BOOM  0 $56,719.44 $0.00 
PE25841 
STEER CYLINDER (NON 
SENSING)  1 $9,248.16 $4,624.08 
PE25851 JACK, REAR  32 $118,440.00 $50,534.40 
PE25864 SHACKLE  0 $921.62 $0.00 
PE25865 SHACKLE PIN  2 $940.24 $537.28 
PE25866 
STEER CYLINDER 
SENSING  0 $48,827.52 $0.00 
PE25870 WARNING PLATE  0 $3,383.90 $0.00 
PE25947 WASHER M8 X 4 THICK  0 $926.40 $0.00 
PE25952 LIFT CYLINDER  5 $394,913.40 $46,460.40 
PE25966 CENTRE TUBE ASSY  5 $3,552.00 $177.60 
PE26099 JACK, FRONT  0 $45,691.00 $0.00 
PE26120 PIN  0 $8,862.00 $0.00 
PE26163 2' EXTENDER FRAME  0 $131,680.00 $0.00 
PE26166 ROLLER BRACKET LINK  0 $4,556.80 $0.00 
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PE26182 1' EXTENDER FRAME  0 $26,336.00 $0.00 
PE26192 
FRAME - FULL WIDTH 
FRONT ROLLER  0 $278,929.60 $0.00 
PE26194 
YOKE, CENTRE 
CYLINDER  0 $14,809.60 $0.00 
PE26199 PIN, CYLINDER CLEVIS  0 $12,460.00 $0.00 
PE26204 
PIN, CYLINDER, CENTRE 
ROLLER  0 $7,654.00 $0.00 
PE26206 
11.5 LINCH PIN/LANYARD 
ASSY  0 $1,185.30 $0.00 
PE26217 SUSPENSION FRAME  1 $123,718.32 $11,247.12 
PE26220 WEIGHT, 10KG  0 $13,251.20 $0.00 
PE26232_LH 
SPRAYGUARD, CENTRE 
ROLLER_LH  0 $111,310.90 $0.00 
PE26232_RH 
SPRAYGUARD, CENTRE 
ROLLER_RH  1 $111,310.90 $2,619.08 
PE26235 SPRAY FLAP  3 $24,920.00 $747.60 
PE26236 SPRAY FLAP  1 $24,920.00 $249.20 
PE26243 EDGE STRIP (620 LONG)  0 $3,026.00 $0.00 
PE26244 EDGE STRIP (300 LONG)  0 $3,026.00 $0.00 
PE26306 CYLINDER, LIFT  1 $132,521.60 $6,626.08 
PE26317 
PIN - UPPER FRAME / 
BOOM  0 $8,541.00 $0.00 
PE26372 SPACER  2 $14,908.50 $265.04 
PE26373 DISK, ROTOR  1 $7,952.00 $397.60 
PE26374 PLATE, LOWER  1 $6,625.60 $331.28 
PE26375 PLATE, TOP  1 $7,952.00 $397.60 
PE26377 FRICTION PAD  1 $2,651.20 $66.28 
PE26381 PLATE, UPPER  1 $5,301.60 $265.08 
PE26426 
SUSPENSION UNIT TYPE 
DW-A.70 x 200  78 $674,620.00 $210,481.44 
PE26468 SPRING - SPRAY GUARD  0 $38,293.50 $0.00 
PE26469-LH 
SUPPORT, SPRAY 
GUARD, LH  0 $79,656.50 $0.00 
PE26469-RH 
SUPPORT, SPRAY 
GUARD, RH  0 $79,656.50 $0.00 
PE26486 
RUBBER - SPLASH 
GUARD  0 $147,708.00 $0.00 
PE26510 
CLAMP PLATE, SHORT, 
SPRAY GUARD  10 $5,826.00 $776.80 
PE26511 
CLAMP PLATE, LONG, 
SPRAY GUARD  11 $11,652.00 $1,708.96 
PE26512 
CLAMP STRIP, SHORT, 
SPRAY GUARD  6 $2,130.00 $170.40 
PE26513 
CLAMP STRIP, LONG, 
SPRAY GUARD  0 $3,500.80 $0.00 
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PE26537 SLINGING DATA PLATE  0 $4,798.44 $0.00 
PE26854 BRACKET, RHINO  1 $13,133.52 $709.92 
PE26901 AXLE/HUB ASSEMBLY  14 $559,507.00 $24,101.84 
PE26922 CASTOR COLLAR  0 $81,052.40 $0.00 
PE26931 
HOSE, F TOP BOOM 
QRA-F CTR LIFT CYL  1 $2,666.52 $296.28 
PE26932 
HOSE , ACCUMULATOR - 
BULKHEAD CONN.  0 $2,666.52 $0.00 
PE30003 BANJO 3/8" BSP 90 DEG  0 $395.20 $0.00 
PE30043 TRAILING ARM PLATE  6 $62,118.00 $4,259.52 
PE30081 12 mm TEE COUPLING  0 $355.68 $0.00 
PE30082 STEEL TUBE  0 $2,666.52 $0.00 
PE30083 STEEL TUBE  0 $2,666.52 $0.00 
PE30084 
3/8" BSP MALE - 18 mm 
MALE   ADAPTOR  0 $59.40 $0.00 
PE30191 
PIN (CENTRE ROLLER, 
TOWING)  0 $6,652.80 $0.00 
PE30192 CAP PLATE (TOWING)  0 $5,868.00 $0.00 
PE30460 CASTOR COLLAR  1 $27,450.40 $1,372.52 
PE30908 FRONT PIVOT (Gen 3)  7 $639,716.00 $51,177.28 
PE30921 PIN - UPPER BOOM  0 $46,088.00 $0.00 
PE30955 
PIN CROSS 
BEAM/FRAME  7 $307,229.00 $13,234.48 
PE30956 WASHER, LOCK  7 $885.00 $82.60 
PE30957 NUT, LOCK  7 $5,907.00 $551.32 
PE30965 SPACER  6 $8,865.00 $709.20 
PE30978 WASHER FLAT M42  0 $1,102.40 $0.00 
PE30984 PUMP, RECHARGING  0 $23,702.40 $0.00 
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Table 7. Soldier Maintenance Kit 










Stock at 25% 
KP00461 AXLE ASSEMBLY KIT 186 47 
ND0048 SCREW HEX M8X25L 279 70 
ND0050 SCREW HEX M10X16L 20 5 
ND0065 SCREW HEX M20X50L GRD 8.8 P 34 9 
ND0075 HEX NUT, FULL, M12 25 7 
ND0076 NUT HEX  FULL M16 23 6 
ND0082 WASHER SINGLE COIL SPRING M8 74 19 
ND0083 WASHER SINGLE COIL SPRING M10 40 10 
ND0084 WASHER SINGLE COIL M12 STL P 17 5 
ND0085 WASHER SINGLE COIL SPRING M16 9 3 
ND0092 WASHER FLAT M12 102 26 
ND0114 SCREW HEX M12X40L 87 22 
ND0154 SPLIT KEY RING 30MM O/D 184 46 
ND0285 PIN 154 39 
ND0293 PIN, SAFETY LINCH 76 19 
ND0294 PIN, SAFETY LINCH 208 52 
ND0295 PIN, SAFETY LINCH 97 25 
ND0306 NUT SELF-LOCKING M12 69 18 
ND0312 HEX NUT NYLOC M10 220 55 
ND0548 BOLT HEX M16X150L 8 2 
ND0763 SCREW CAP SOCKET 475 119 
ND0923 BOLT HEX M12x50L 90 23 
ND1002 SCREW HEX HD M8X30 GRD 8.8 ZINC PLT 712 178 
ND10235 SPACER 350 88 
ND10248 SPACER 955 239 
ND1207 M20 NYLOC NUT 52 13 
ND1209 NUT NYLOC M8 TYPE P GRD 8 ZINC PLT 747 187 
ND2627 BOLT HEX M10x70L 226 57 
ND2646 LOCKING COLLAR 9 3 
ND3325 GREASE NIPPLE STRAIGHT M8 X 1.25P 31 8 
ND4359 LOCTITE 243 (THREADLOCK) 9 3 
ND4418 WASHER SERRATED SAFETY M20 146 37 
ND4726 SCREW HEX M12 x 150 LONG 8 2 
ND5087 WASHER SERRATED M12 88 22 
ND5705 BOLT HEX M12X110 L 74 19 
 =
^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = = - 84 -=  
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=










Stock at 25% 
ND6764 THRUST WASHER 130 O/D X 102 I/D X 6 THK 10 3 
ND7095 SCREW SKT CAP M20x50L 476 119 
ND7342 SPLIT KEY RING 16MM O/D 71 18 
ND7942 LONG-LINK FISHING CHAIN 1/2" 13 4 
ND8847 M6 GREASE NIPPLE 5 2 
ND8953 GREASE NIPPLE COVER 170 43 
ND8992 MEDIUM DUTY SAFETY WASHER M12 88 22 
ND8994 SUSPENSION UNIT TYPE DW-A.70 x 200 642 161 
ND9218 5/8" ROUND PIN SHACKLE (3.25 Tonne) 16 4 
ND9222 NUT - M16 - 14mm SPHERICAL SEAT 417 105 
ND9330 SWIVEL ROD END 45 BORE M42 X 3P 21 6 
PE20611 LANYARD - OVER CENTRE STOP 125 32 
PE24417 PIN 9 3 
PE24567 UPPER PIVOT FRAME 8 2 
PE24606 PIN - LOWER PIVOT FRAME MOUNTING 163 41 
PE24609 PIN - FRAME CENTRE / PIVOT FRAME 7 2 
PE24611 ACCUMULATOR COVER 7 2 
PE24620 PIN - SUSPENSION FRAME 2 1 
PE24646 DIRT GUARD 5 2 
PE24690 INDICATOR ROD ASSEMBLY 120 30 
PE24975 WHEEL & TYRE 434 109 
PE24979 CLEVIS END L.H. 28 7 
PE24980 CLEVIS END R.H. 26 7 
PE24981 MODIFIED WASHER M30 FLAT 11 3 
PE24983 CHAIN LINK ADJUSTER BLOCK 8 2 
PE25097 JACK ASSEMBLY, FRONT 84 21 
PE25608 JACK ASSEMBLY 4 1 
PE25811 WASHER M10 X 4 THICK 45 12 
PE25851 JACK 151 38 
PE25947 WASHER M8 X 4 THICK 66 17 
PE25966 CENTRE TUBE ASSY 23 6 
PE26099 JACK, FRONT 25 7 
PE26199 PIN, CYLINDER CLEVIS 26 7 
PE26204 PIN, CYLINDER, CENTRE ROLLER 26 7 
PE26220 WEIGHT, 10KG 42 11 
PE26232_LH SPRAYGUARD, CENTRE ROLLER_LH 43 11 
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Stock at 25% 
PE26232_RH SPRAYGUARD, CENTRE ROLLER_RH 2 1 
PE26235 SPRAY FLAP 15 4 
PE26236 SPRAY FLAP 5 2 
PE26237 ASSY, SPRAY GUARD, CENTRE, LH 1 1 
PE26242 ASSY, SPRAY GUARD, CENTRE, RH 1 1 
PE26243 EDGE STRIP (620 LONG) 43 11 
PE26244 EDGE STRIP (300 LONG) 43 11 
PE26426 SUSPENSION UNIT TYPE DW-A.70 x 200 373 94 
PE26510 CLAMP PLATE, SHORT, SPRAY GUARD 49 13 
PE26511 CLAMP PLATE, LONG, SPRAY GUARD 51 13 
PE26512 CLAMP STRIP, SHORT, SPRAY GUARD 29 8 
PE26854 BRACKET, RHINO 4 1 
PE26901 AXLE/HUB ASSEMBLY 68 17 
PE26922 CASTOR COLLAR 111 28 
PE30043 TRAILING ARM PLATE 26 7 
PE30099 3 SUSPENSION FRAME 1 1 
PE30192 CAP PLATE (TOWING) 21 6 
PE31319-LH SUPPORT, SPRAY GUARD, LH 13 4 
PE31319-RH SUPPORT, SPRAY GUARD, RH 11 3 
PE31321 SPRING - SPRAY GUARD 54 14 
PE31326 CLAMP STRIP, LONG, SPRAY GUARD 34 9 
6220-00-878-7301 FLOODLIGHTS 67 17 
6220-01-561-9674 LIGHTS MINEROLLER 152 38 
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